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The genius of the United States Constitution lies not only in what
it contains, but also, ironically, in what it omits. Because it is merely a
skeletal framework, the Constitution permits the specific nature of its
own application to vary with the social, cultural, and political changes
that inevitably accompany the progression of time.' While this has
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This concept was articulated adeptly by Judge Thomas M. Cooley in the case of
P,',ple v. Hurlbut:
If this charter of... government we call a Constitution, were all there was of
constitutional command; if the usages, the customs, the maxims, that have
sprung from the habits of life, modes of thought .... and mutual
responsibility in neighborhood interests, the precepts which have come from
the rexolutions which overturned tyrannies, the sentiments of manly
independence and self-control which impelled our ancestors to summon the
local community to redress local evils, instead of relying upon king or
legislature at a distance to do so-if a recognition of all these were to be
stricken from the body of our constitutional law, a lifeless skeleton might
remain, but the living spirit, that which gives it force and attraction, which
makes itxaluable and draws to it the affections of the people, that which
distinguishes it from the numberless constitutions, so called, which in Europe
have been set up and thrown down within the last hundred years, many of
which, in their expressions, have seemed equally fair and to possess equal
promise with ours, and have only been wanting in support and vitality which
(1507)
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allowed the document to transcend the changing circumstances
brought by the centuries, such longevity has been realized through
the imposition of a burden upon each generation to redefine and
reinterpret the many balances and compromises it strikes.
Among these balances is one that constitutes the focus of this
Comment. The First Amendment guarantees individuals the right to
exercise freely their religious convictions,2 yet it is also clear in its
pronouncement that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."3 Despite being intended as means to the
common end of securing "religious liberty,"4 the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses often find themselves at odds with one another,
especially as state efforts to promote and secure free exercise creep
closer to the line demarcating the institutionalized preference of
religion over "irreligion."5 When this threshold is crossed, the
Establishment Clause mandates the invalidation of such governmental
action.6 Indeed, the principles underlying these clauses have clashed
these alone can give-this living and breathing spirit, which supplies the
interpretation of the words of the written charter, would be utterly lost and
gone.
24 Mich. 44, 107 (1871).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion].").
3 Id.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)); see also Michael W. McConnell & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 33
(1989) ("The two provisions are complementary, together protecting religious choice
from government interference whether in favor of a religion (or religion in general)
or ajainst it.").
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1952) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[G]overnmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the
First Amendment."); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 325 (Jackson,J., dissenting) ("The day that this
country ceases to be free for irreligion it will cease to be free for religion-except for
the sect that can win political power."); see also Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
1, 5 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (holding that a sales tax exemption that is
confined to religious publications violates the Establishment Clause when other
publications are denied such an exemption); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968) ("The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."); Edward J. Eberle, Roger
Williams' Gift: Religious Freedom in America, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 425, 476-77
("This principle [that government may not aid religion] has been consistently
articulated, and applied to invalidate [even] religion over nonreligion." (citing Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 611-12 (1992))).
Some have disputed this proposition, especially in the context of the Framers'
intent. Stephen V. Monsma, quoting Michael J. Malbin, has effectively presented this
view:
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on the federal level, in the context of congressional enactments aimed
at securing religious liberty,7 and on the state level regarding, for
instance, school prayer." The potential for significant conflict
between them also exists in areas governed primarily by local
regulation," and zoning is foremost among these likely arenas of
antagonism.
There may be no power at the disposal of local government more
The Court [in adopting the view embodied in Justice Stevens's Boerne
concurrence] has simply misread history. One scholar who has made one of
the most thorough studies of the debates of the First Congress [the body
which enacted the Bill of Rights] on the adoption of the religion language of
the First Amendment concluded:
All of the speakers, except [Roger] Sherman [of Connecticut], agreed
that the Bill of Rights should prohibit the new government from
establishing a national religion. In addition, they did not want the
govermnent to have the power deliberately to favor one religion over
another. But every one of them seemed to agree that the Bill of Rights
should not prevent the federal government from giving
nondiscriminatory assistance to religion.... Madison, even though he
privately questioned the efficacy of governmental assistance to religion,
accepted the... [nondiscriminatory assistance] view throughout the First
Congress debates.
STEPHEN V. MONSMA, PosImE NEUTRALTIy. LETTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RING 37
(1993) (quoting MICHAELJ. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITIcs: THE INTENTIONS OF
THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1978)); see also Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (disagreeing
with those who contend that the Establishment Clause prevents a preference for
religion over irreligion). This Comment, however, takes the view that such a reading
of the Framers' intent is actually a misconstruction of the true meaning of the
Establishment Clause, as argued below. See infra Part II.
7 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, designed to secure the free exercise right, runs
afoul of the Establishment Clause).
I See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (analyzing a Rhode Island
practice regarding school prayer);Jaffrty, 472 U.S. at 61 (striking down an Alabama law
prodiding for a period of silence at the beginning of the school day "for meditation or
voluntary prayer").
" Naturally, because the Bill of Rights is applicable only to the federal government,
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833), the relevance of such a conflict,
from a constitutional standpoint, is wholly contingent upon the incorporation of these
clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment. While some have argued against the
propriety of such incorporation, "[sluch arguments are unpersuasive .... While they
are technically correct from a rigid perspective of original intent, they are irrelevant."
MONSMA,, supra note 6, at 35. Indeed, subsequent developments in constitutional law
have unambiguously held state and local governments responsible for adherence to
the mandates of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. See, e.g., Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The First Amendment declares that Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.").
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capable of affecting the rights and abilities of individuals and groups
to engage in given activities than zoning.' A municipality's zoning
regulations may restrict the geographical areas of the municipality in
which activities may be conducted; the size of properties on which
those activities may transpire; the types of facilities that may be
required on those properties if they are to be validly undertaken; and
the conditions, such as hours of operation, under which they may be
conducted.
Of course, zoning regulations have the potential to restrict secular
and nonsecular activities alike. However, many jurisdictions have, to
varying degrees, facilitated the implementation and expansion of
religious uses to an extent not demonstrated when only secular uses
have been involved. Indeed, such favoritism has been mandated by
federal statutory law, most notably by the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.11 Upon introducing this bill,
Senator Orrin Hatch indicated that "[a]t the core of religious
freedom is the ability for assemblies to gather and worship
together.... Finding a location to do so, however, can be quite
difficult when faced with pervasive land use regulations. " z
Accordingly, this statute sharply curtails the ability of localities and
municipalities to enforce zoning ordinances "that impose[] a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person.' 3
More frequently, this sort of favoritism has been the product of
10 See Richard Briffault. The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CoNN.
L. REV. 773, 784 n.48 (1992) ("Local control is a major factor.., in land use control,
which is the most important local regulatory power. Local control over zoning is...
testimony to the powerful hold of the principle of local autonomy in practice in the
American legal system." (citation omitted)); Katia Brener, Note, Belle Terre and Single
Family Home Ordinances: Judicial Perceptions of Local Government and the Presumption of
Validity, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 447, 482 (1999) (stating that zoning ordinances may serve to
isolate suburban residents and to exclude nonaffluent individuals and low- and
moderate-income families from membership within a community).
n Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000cc (West Supp. 2000).
12 David W. Dunlap, God, Caesar and Zoning, N.Y. TLMES, Aug. 27, 2000, § 11, at 4.
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(a) (1). The statute reads in full:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or
institution-
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
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both federal" and, especially, state common law.' Specifically,
common law maxims requiring the waiver or abnormally flexible
application of dimensional and use regulations of all sorts-including
minimum building set-back and lot area requirements; maximum
floor-area ratio and lot coverage requirements; height and parking
limitations; and occupancy ceilings, to name only a few-entail the
potential to affect results of this preferential variety. More
fundamentally, several jurisdictions feature jurisprudential regimes
that are notable for having institutionalized a positive general
predisposition toward religious land uses. Often assuming the form of
a maxim that nonsecular uses will be considered presumptively valid,
this pro-religious stance constitutes preferential treatment in and of
itself. Moreover, it may underlie determinations that any particular
zoning requirement is to be relaxed where a religious land use is
involved. This Comment is concerned with the applicability of zoning
regulations generally to religious land uses, and as such will not focus
upon any specific type of regulation.
it Se, e.g., Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc. 224 F.3d 283, 292
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Establishment Clause was not violated by a county
zoning ordinance exempting parochial schools located on church-owned or
-leased land from a special exception requirement); Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of
Starkville, Miss., 840 F.2d 293, 294 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause prevented the defendant municipality from excluding a mosque from its
borders, even where it %as possible, at least in the de jure sense, for a permit allowing
the construction of a religious structure to be granted by the city aldermen).
'. Se, e.g., Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, 626 P.2d
668, 674 (Colo. 1981) (recognizing that "the law provides preferential treatment for
churches"); Grace Cmty. Church v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 615 A.2d 1092, 1103
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (describing the state constitution's preferential treatment of
churches); Rogers v. Mayor & Aldermen, 137 S.E.2d 668, 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
(favoring religious purposes in zoning); City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word
Outreach Full Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc., 707 N.E.2d 53, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(requiring that the city have a "compelling interest" to impose zoning regulations on a
church), affd in part, rev'd in part, No. 87101, 2001 WL 290835 (Ill. Mar. 22, 2001)
(unofficial disposition); Church of Christ v. Marion County Metro. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 371 N.E.2d 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (favoring religious purposes in zoning);
Mooney v. Vill. of Orchard Lake, 53 N.W.2d 308, 309 (Mich. 1952); Chaminade Coll.
Preparatory, Inc. v. City of Creve Coeur, 956 S.W.2d 440, 441-42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
Kali Bari Temple v. Readington Bd. of Adjustment, 638 A.2d 839, 844 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994); Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 503 N.E.2d 509, 515 (N.Y. 1986); State ex
rel Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church v. Joseph, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (Ohio
1942); Northeast Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Salem, 651 P.2d 193, 194 (Or. Ct. App.
1982); Marsden v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 01-A-01-9012-CH00455, 1991 WL 66473,
at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 1991); City of Sherman v. Simms, 183 S.W.2d 415, 416
(Tex. 1944); State ex re. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of
Wenatchee, 312 P.2d 195, 197 (Wash. 1957); State ew rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v.
Vill. of Bayside Bd. of Trs., 108 N.W.2d 288, 295-96 (Wis. 1961).
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In some states, including New York, a strong presumptive validity
attaches to religious uses. '6 In others, like California, such uses enjoy
no preferential treatment whatsoever. 7 In many other jurisdictions,
various intermediary positions have been espoused, all entailing the
reservation of some special status or preference for religious land
uses. 8 This Comment argues, however, that this judicially sanctioned
favoritism is, as a matter of historical interpretation, modern
jurisprudence, and religious liberty-focused policy considerations, a
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Instead of sanctioning such institutionalized preference for religion
over irreligion, a more appropriate balance between the First
Amendment Religion Clauses in the zoning context could be struck
by ensuring that religious uses are subject to neutral laws of general
applicability. This is an indispensable means of effectuating the end
of religious liberty that is so vital to our shared constitutional
tradition.
In demarcating this as an appropriate resolution to the conflict
between the First Amendment Religion Clauses, the lessons of this
Comment hopefully will be generalizable and will suggest a more
appropriate balance between disestablishment and free exercise in
other contexts within our legal order.
The Comment is structured as follows: Part I outlines the First
Amendment problems posed by the exemption of religious land uses
from neutral zoning laws of general applicability. Part II deals with
several aspects of the historical background and intellectual traditions
which should inform modern interpretations of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses. Here the Comment focuses especially on the impact
of (1) the ideas of John Locke and European enlightenment
philosophers, (2) the early American colonial experience, (3) the
ideas and experiences of Roger Williams as representative of the early
16 See Kenneth Pearlman, Zoning and the Location of Religious Establishments, 31
CATH. LAW. 314, 317-21 (1988) (describing the "New York approach" to zoning and its
relationship to the Free Exercise Clause). Indeed, New York's pro-religious leaning is
so strong that a municipality may not validly exclude religious uses from residential
districts. See infra text accompanying note 19.
1 [I]n California a church is to be treated just like any nonsectarian
enterprise when determining the extent of its compliance with zoning
legislation .... [A] church, like any other property owner, is to be considered
on its merits as fitting into the general scheme of a comprehensive zoning,
entitled to no preference and subject to no adverse discrimination."
Lucas Valley Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Marin, 233 Cal. App. 3d 130, 143 (1991)
(quoting Minney v. City of Azusa, 330 P.2d 255, 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)).
See supra note 15 (listing cases).
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nonsecular reformist spirit, and (4) the ideas and experiences of
James Madison. Part III analyzes constitutional and policy-based
justifications for the exemption of religious land uses from neutral
zoning laws. The conclusion reached is that neither the Free Exercise
Clause nor any extralegal notion that religious uses are somehow
desirable or inherently beneficial to a community justify the
exemption of places of worship from such regulations. Finally, Part IV
suggests that rendering all land uses, regardless of their ecclesiastical
character, subject to truly neutral zoning laws is actually an
indispensable means of protecting religious liberty. This suggestion is
presented in the context of some of the more prevalent strains of the
contemporary discourse on the proper balance between the First
Amendment Religion Clauses.
I. THE PROBLEM OF EXEMPTING RELIGIOUS LAND USES FROM
NEUTRAL ZONING LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
Conceptually, the troublesome preference for religious land uses
is quite simple, and is effectively summarized by Terry Rice ithin the
context of New York common law:
It has been clear, since the 1956 decision in Diocese of Rochester v. Planning
Board, that a zoning law may not exclude educational and religious uses
from a community's residential districts.... [T]he conclusion [of the
New York Court of Appeals in Trustees of Union College v. Schenectady City
Counci] is consistent with the forty-year-old determination of Diocese of
Rochest,; [as] the decision reinforces the obligation of New York
municipalities to explicitly permit religious and educational uses in all of
its residential zoning districts by right or special permit. "The New York
courts have consistently taken an expansive view of what constitutes a
religious use and have held that a religious use is more than just prayer
and worship.... The activities constituting religious or accessory uses
which alte entitled to preferential treatment have also been broadly
construed."
1'l
Decisions like those discussed by Rice, both in New York and the
many other states wherein such preferences are part of the governing
Terry Rice, Zoning and Land Use 48 SIRACUSE L. REv. 1075, 1114-15 (1998)
(emphasis added) (quoting Terry Rice, Re-Evaluating the Balance Between Zoning and
Rdigious and Educational Uses, 8 PACE L. REV. 1, 20 (1998), and citing Diocese of
Rochester v. Planning Bd., 136 N.E.2d 827, 834 (N.Y. 1956) (implying that religious
uses are entitled to strong presumptive validity and preferential judicial treatment));
so Trs. of Union Coll. v. Members of the Schenectady City Council, 656 N.Y.S.2d 425,
427-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (reaffirming the holding in Diocese of Rochester), affd, 91
N.Y.2d 161 (1997)).
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common law, 20 are the product of the notions that "religious
institutions... [make] unique contribution[s] to the public welfare
and because of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause."2' The
states are virtually uniform in holding that religious land uses may be
required to conform to neutral zoning regulations, fire and building
codes, and the like.2 Yet the contradictory judicial practices of
deeming such uses presumptively valid or declaring the
impermissibility of their complete exclusion from residential zones
have been predicated upon "the concept that such zoning restrictions
must yield to the right of freedom of religion protected by the [F] irst
and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments to the United States [C]onstitution
and comparable provisions in state constitutions where the zoning
regulations unreasonably hinder or restrict religious activities."2'
As this Comment cautions, however, the fact that a facially neutral
zoning ordinance serves to exclude a church from a residential zoning
district does not indicate that the law is per se an unconstitutional
hindrance of religious activities. After all, municipalities are free to
impose neutral rules of general applicability upon places of worship
within their perimeters. Upon what basis, then, could rest a rule that
declares neutral zoning laws to be legally invalid where those
20 See supra note 15 (listing cases); see also Grace Cmty. Church v. Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 615 A.2d 1092, 1102-03 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (listing cases from
various jurisdictions).
21 Shelley Ross Saxer, When Religion Becomes a Nuisance: Balancing Land Use and
Religious Freedom When Activities of Religious Institutions Bring Outsiders into the
Neighborhood, 84 KY. L.J. 507, 508-09 (1996). Constitutional objections to the
placement of limits on religious freedom may also be based in the constitutions of the
several states, which are free to "provide greater protection of rights than the federal
constitution gives." Grace Cmty. Church, 615 A.2d at 1103 (citing Husti v. Zuckennan
Prop. Enters., Ltd., 508 A.2d 735, 742 (Conn. 1986)); see also First Covenant Church v.
City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (Wash. 1992) ("Although we might distinguish this
case from Smith 11... we decline to do so... and [we] rest our decision also on
independent grounds under the Washington constitution.").
To the extent that a state constitution grants religious land uses the right to be
free from neutral zoning laws of general applicability, however, that particular
provision is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. A
prime example is Grace Communit Church, in which the court stated that "under the
facts of the present case and considering... article seventh of the constitution of
Connecticut,... the zoning regulations would be unconstitutional as applied to the
plaintiff's property." 615 A.2d at 1104. That article states that "[e]ach [religious
association] ... may build and repair houses for public worship." CONN. CONST. art. 7.
22 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (holding that neutral
regulation of religious uses among all other land uses is unproblematic under the First
Amendment); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-14 (1971) (same).
2 Grace Cmty. Church, 615 A.2d at 1103.
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regulations, when applied in a genuinely nondiscriminatory fashion,
serve to exclude places of worship?24  If it is otherwise permissible
under the Free Exercise Clause to engage in neutral regulation of a
religious use, these regulations do not become Free Exercise
violations if the use cannot comply with those rules. Yet to the extent
that the decisions and practices detailed above rely on the First
Amendment, by prohibiting the exclusion of places of worship from
residential districts, they serve as the functional equivalent to that
rule.
A more logical justification for the common law maxim is that, as
many courts have stated, 25 religious uses are somehow inherently
beneficial to the communities in which they are situated. Indeed, the
fact that preferential treatment often is afforded to both religious and
educational land uses2" indicates a belief that such uses share
characteristics that render their presence within a community
particularly desirable. Permitting the use despite its nonconformance
with neutral zoning laws, according to this rationale, would be
legitimized on policy grounds. The New York Court of Appeals states:
"a zoning ordinance may not wholly exclude a church or synagogue
from an), residential district... [since such a restriction] bears no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, peace or
general welfare of the community."2 7  Yet this justification looks
suspiciously similar to an explicit preference for religion over
irreligion, in violation of modem Supreme Court Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and contrary to the visions of James Madison
and of those thinkers upon whose ideas he predicated his own. "
-A This would, of course, be the result if a religious use is unable to comply with
the zoning regulation.
&'e Kali Bari Temple v. Bd. of Adjustment, 638 A.2d 839, 843 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994) (-It has been held that a church use is inherently beneficial." (citing
Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification v. Rosenfeld, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920, 925-26 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984))).
S " g., %Lss. GEN. LWs ch. 40A, § 3 (1993) ("No zoning ordinance...
shall.., prohibit, regulate or restrict the use of land or structures for religious
purposes or for educational purposes...."); Rice, supra note 19, at 1114 ("[A] zoning
law may not exclude educational and religious uses from a community's residential
districts.").
i.7 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 136 N.E.2d 827, 834 (N.Y. 1956); see also
Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 503 N.E.2d 509,514 (N.Y. 1986) ("Because of the inherently
beneficial nature of churches.., to the public, we held that the total exclusion of such
institutions from a residential district serves no end that is reasonably related to the
morals, health, welfare and safety of the community.").
Ser i f a Part II (delineating the historical bases for a modem interpretation of
the First Amendment Religion Clauses).
5
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To completely appreciate the offense done to the Establishment
Clause by a judicially legitimized preference for places of worship as
opposed to other land uses, it is necessary to understand the ideals
that drove Madison, as he framed the First Amendment, 9 and the
individuals upon whose ideas he reliedY30 Of course, a truly
comprehensive survey of the entire body of thought reflected in the
words and spirit of the Religion Clauses would require a multivolume
work, and in truth, it is doubtful that even such an extensive
undertaking could truly contemplate all of the relevant intellectual
strains.3' Here the aim is far more modest-this Comment merely
seeks to provide a sampling of the notions of the most salient thinkers
and of the sorts of philosophical approaches embodied in their works,
as gauged by their impact upon Madison.
Once this theoretical background is established, the inconsistency
between these underpinnings and a common law preference for
religious land uses becomes clear. It also becomes possible to offer a
resolution to this conflict in the specific context of "religious zoning,"
and further, to suggest the best way in which the Religion Clauses can
29 But see Mark M. Arkin, Regionalism and the Religion Clauses: The Contribution of
Fisher Ames, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 763, 763-71 (1999) (highlighting the historically
understated role of Fisher Ames as the source of the language now embodied in the
First Amendment).
30 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 501 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("'No provision of the
Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating history than the
religious clause of the First Amendment. It is at once the refined product and the
terse summation of that history.'" (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting))); see also Daniel L. Dreisbach, A Lively and Fair
Experiment: Religion and the American Constitutional Tradition, 49 EMoRY L.J. 223, 242
(2000) ("It is a tortured logic that credits any one individual, party, or movement with
the establishment of religious liberty in America. The story of this lively and fair
experiment would be incomplete... without acknowledging the vital roles played by
the Puritans and the Evangelical dissenters .... It is hard to imagine, for example, the
achievement of religious disestablishment and liberty in Virginia without the
imagination ofJohn Locke; the eloquence and legislative leadership of George Mason,
James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson; the encouragement of George Washington and
Patrick Henry; and the convictions and agitation of Evangelical congregations.").
31 Several works focus solely upon the historical background of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, or some subsegment thereof, and are far more
complete than any account included here ever could be. See, e.g., THOMASJ. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1986) (surveying conflicting critical interpretations of the Religion
Clauses); Comment, First Amendment Religion Clause: Historical Metamorphosis, 61 Nw. U.
L. REv. 760 (1966) (exploring the development of church-state relations).
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be reconciled with each other, regardless of the specific
circumstances.
The important point, worth keeping in mind when considering
this issue, is that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses were
intended as means to a common end; in enacting both, the Framers
intended to create a barrier against the usurpation of religious
freedom.-' Indeed, this protection was an essential element of the
natural rights tradition that animated Jefferson, Madison, and the rest
of the Framers." Upon consideration, the logic undergirding the
need for both First Amendment Religion Clauses appears clear; an
individual's liberty to practice her chosen religion can be usurped just
as easily by the institutionalization of a state-sponsored preference for
a set of beliefs which differs from her own as through direct inhibition
of her favored creed. Therefore, both forms of interference must be
prohibited in order to ensure the maintenance of religious freedom.
,. See Wallace v. Jaffrey, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[The] common purpose [of the First Amendment Religion Clauses] is to secure
religious liberty.... On these principles the Court has been and remains unanimous."
(citation omitted)); see also Comment, supra note 31, at 769 (stating that the intent of
the First Amendment was, at least in part, to protect the free exercise of religion by
placing all religious matters beyond the purview of state authority). Specifically, the
Court has been clear in its repeated assertions that through these provisions, "'[tihe
structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the
temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured
religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.'" Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87, 120
(1843)). At least one commentator, however, while not taking issue with this notion in
a normative sense, has disputed the Court's self-proclaimed pattern of ascribing a
commonality of purpose to these clauses. See MONSMA, supra note 6, at 18 ("I contend
that... the Supreme Court has [mistakenly assumed] ... that the religion provisions
of the First Amendment should be read as two distinct clauses with two distinct
objectives, rather than one provision with one objective....").
See David A.J. Richards, Civil Religion and Constitutional Legitimacy, 29 WM. &
MAXRY L. REN,. 177 (1987) (engaging in a comprehensive discussion of the intellectual
tradition upon which the Framers' work was based); Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District: Equal Protection, Neutrality, and the Establishment Clause, 43 CATH. U. L.
REv. 1209, 1216 (1994) (describing Jefferson's condemnation of the establishment of
religion). Richards argues that although Madison
probably rejected Hume's religious skepticism and certainly rejected his
attacks on Lockean contractarianism and inalienable natural rights[,
Madison] notoriously followed Hume and Harrington in regarding religion
itself as yet another locus of faction, . . . and argued for corresponding
constitutional constraints on its force[, including] the substantive constraints
of the Religion Clauses of the first amendment.
Richards, supra, at 178-79 (citations omitted).
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A. The Impact ofJohn Locke and Continental European Enlightenmewnt
Philosophers on the Framers of the First Amendment
Although sentiments such as those discussed immediately above
were not manifested in constitutional mandates until 1791, :" the
intellectual origins of the Framers' reasoning are traceable at least to
philosophers of the European Enlightenment. , As Anson Phelps
Stokes and Leo Pfeffer state,
[among these individuals were] Charles Louis Montesquieu, a believer in
a written constitution, whose L'esprit des lois appeared in 1748 ith its
comparative study of the ideas of a republic, a monarchy, and a
despotism;Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose Contrat social, with its theory of
popular sovereignty and the need of full citizenship for the complete
development of manhood, appeared in 1762; and Francois Marie de
Voltaire, who strongly opposed any State Church with exclusive rights
and privileges and pleaded for full religious freedom.I3
Yet it was John Locke, in whose earlier writings we find the origins
of the social libertarian notion of state-citizen relations, who most
swayed Jefferson, Madison, and, indeed, eighteenth-century American
political thought as a whole.3 In fact, "[a]ll the important figures of
the founding generation, including John Otis, John and Samuel
Adams, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and
Benjamin Franklin, were disciples of Locke." Locke's teachings
powerfully and directly affected the substance of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses. Indeed, the core of his natural-rights-centered
notions lay in his contention that "the state's origin was not shrouded
in the impenetrable mystery of divine gift or dispensation."' Instead,
it was the people "who voluntarily contracted to set up governments in
order to protect their natural rights to life, liberty, and property"'
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35 See ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 4 (1964) (describing the influence of several such individuals upon the
thinking of some of the founders of the American republic); cf. Kirk A. Kennedy,
Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence ofJustice Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENTI U. L. REV.
33, 44 (1997) (suggesting that the natural law tradition is rooted in "the classical and
Christian traditions of Cicero, Aquinas, and Richard Hooker").
36 STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 35, at 4.
37 Id.; see also ISAAC KRAMfNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS
CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 72-73 (1996) (describing
Locke's influence in America).
KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 37, at 72.
"9 Id. at 73.
4 Id.
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who were the source of the power and legitimacy of the state.
Lockean sociopolitical theory thus featured a respect for the right
of individuals to pursue life's rudimentary fulfillments and freedoms,
a liberty endowed unto them by nothing more than the humanity
inherent in their beings. Consequently, the system of governance
established by Locke's disciples would take no part in the "defen[se]
and propagat[ion] of moral and religious truths."41 To them, the
realms of governance, where state power exists solely to facilitate and
protect indixidual freedoms, and religion, where God reigns supreme,
were to be kept absolutely separate.2 Indeed, the rationale behind
the "Christian state," 3 which characterized Locke's time, was
undermined by his liberal theory of political relations, which "assigns
[the state] the very mundane and practical role of protecting private
rights." " Hence, given their own liberal intellectual inclinations, the
Framers' placement of barriers between the government and religion
is fairly unsurprising.
Yet while Locke wrote with unmatched influence upon the
American mindset, his theories drew on English experiences. While
conceptually momentous and easily applicable within the American
context, they were also the product of another time, over a century
before the Framers of the First Amendment set about their drafting.
It was only natural, then, for the Framers to draw not only upon
European theory, but also upon American experience. Therefore, it
11 Id.
1" Sc id. at 74 ("Locke sought... 'to distinguish exactly the business of civil
government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the
one and the other.'" (quoting John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, in 35 GREAT
BooKs Or THE WESTERN WORLD 1 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1937) (1689))).
' Id. at 73.
Id.
Some argue that the First Amendment was not in fact intended to prohibit
goxernmental promotion of religion generally, but instead reaches only state
favoritism of one particular religion over any or all other(s). See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffrey,
472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Madison's xiews,] as reflected by
actions on the floor of the House in 1789, [indicate] that he saw the [First]
Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and
perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring
neutrality on the part of government between religion and 'irreligion."'); MALBIN,
qifwa note 6, at 9 (contending similarly). However, this contention, as mentioned
above, , suiipra note 6, has been consistently rejected by the United States Supreme
Court. Sc'e Bd. of Educ. of Kir)as Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703
(1994) (stating that a state preference for religion over irreligion is prohibited by the
Establishment Clause); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) ("[T]his Court
has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only
g, ixernmental preference of one religion over another.").
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would be ill-advised to consider this liberal theoretical background in
isolation.
Long before the Enlightenment Europeans published their
influential works, the American continent was settled by many
individuals whose primary purpose was to escape religious• 46
persecution. Indeed, it is their struggle, and its significant influenceS • 47
upon the substance of the Constitution, that renders the dictates of
the First Amendment uniquely American. To contend otherwise
would be to understate the extent to which the United States
Constitution is more than a mere replica of its temporal
predecessors,48 and thus to foster empirical inaccuracy.
B. The Impact of the Early American Colonists'Experience
on the Framers of the First Amendment
The earliest American settlers were wholly religious people and
yet they were religiously diverse.49  From such a history, one might
46 See Marc L, Rubinstein, Note, Gay Rights and Religion: A Doctrinal Approach to the
Argument that Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives Violate the Establishment Clause, 46 HASTINGS LJ.
1585, 1593 n.36 (1995) ("To summarize briefly, many early American colonists came to
the 'New World' to escape religious persecution.").
47 See generally John Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City on a Hill: The Early Puritan
Contribution to American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 41, 62-64 (1990) (explaining
the beliefs and teachings of seventeenth-century Puritans and their impact on the
substance of the Constitution).
49 See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 35, at 3 (referring to several great European
works such as the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights of 1689, and the Acts of
Toleration of 1689 and 1693). See generally Christopher James Sears, Note, Clinton v.
Jones: The King Has No Clothes (Nor Absolute Immunity to Boot), 100 W. VA. L. REv. 493,
495 (1997) (discussing the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and
highlighting divergences between the substance of those documents and the United
States Constitution).
49 Stokes and Pfeffer comment on the religious bent of the early American
colonists:
The founders of the American colonies were, relatively speaking, largely
political liberals and religious non-conformists .... This was true not only of
the early English immigration but even more so of the West European
migration which followed in 1660 and included so many German sectaries
with Anabaptist backgrounds-Mennonites, Moravians, Quakers, and so on.
Different colonies also had their distinctive religious and ecclesiastical flavor
due to the dominant point of view, such as that of the Puritans in
Massachusetts or of the Anglicans in Virginia; but there were probably more
different religious backgrounds than have been generally recognized.
STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 35, at 22.
Stokes and Pfeffer go on to explain how this diversity later would be perceived by
Jefferson and Madison as conducive to liberty:
The perpetual conflict among the sects was in the long run conducive to
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understandably assume that the Constitution that drew upon their
experiences would be geared toward the promotion of religion. In
truth, some of the early colonists may not have found neutral
governmental support of religion to be problematic, as the Supreme
Court has declared it to be5' and as liberty-minded policy
considerations must find it to be.52
Despite this possible divergence between the early colonists' views
and the Constitution that was influenced thereby, the ideal of
religious tolerance espoused by these dissenters comprises a
significant portion of the conceptual backbone for modern thought
and jurisprudence construing the First Amendment. To properly
comprehend their views, the hardship that produced them, and the
ways in which those ideas were incorporated into the Religion Clauses,
it is necessary to take another, closer look at the lives and beliefs of
some of the early colonists.
The persecutions that provided the impetus for many of the early
settlers' migration to the New World are well documented.' 3 Yet,
importantly, following the Atlantic crossing, the persecutions
continued, as
[tihe very charters granted by the English Crown to the individuals and
companies designated to make the laws which would control the
destinies of the colonials authorized these individuals and companies to
liberty. .. Jefferson and Madison[] realized this. Indeed, the idea goes back
at least to Voltaire [and] his Lettres sur ks Anglais: "If there were one religion
in England, its despotism would be terrible; if there were only two, they would
destroy each other; but there are thirty, and therefore they live in peace and
happiness."
Id. at 23 (quoting letter XI1 from Francois Marie de Voltaire to Mr. Thiriot, reprinted in
VOLTAIRE, LETTERS CONCERNING THE ENGLISH NATION 29, 30 (Nicholas Cronk ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1733)).," Promotion, here, must be distinguished carefully from protection, as the aim of
governmental nonpromotion of religion was to protect the individual's freedom to
worship according to the dictates of her conscience. See infra text accompanying notes
100-03.
'I See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
("IThe right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability .... (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment))).
" &egeneraly infra text accompanying notes 173-76.
SO', ,.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947) (describing the
European practices of religious intolerance which ultimately sparked the voyage of the
Mafrcflower). But cf STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 35, at 21 (describing the efforts of
sexeral modem historians to attribute the migration to various nonreligious factors).
Stokes and Pfeffer, however, do conclude that most likely the largest single influence
guiding the colonists was the desire to escape "ecclesiastical tyranny." Id.
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erect religious establishments which all, whether believers or non-
believers, would be required to support and attend. An exercise of this
authority was accompanied by a repetition of many of the old-world
practices and persecutions. Catholics found themselves hounded and
proscribed because of their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience
went to jail; Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant
54Protestant sects ....
Indeed, the earliest Europeans to arrive in America had no
intention of creating a condition of religious liberty as we conceive of
that notion today. The freedom they sought was the individual's
ability to adhere to her own religious doctrines without interference
from the English crown. In other words, they embraced the ideal of
the "'Christian commonwealth."'55 They merely wished to experience
it on their own terms, not on those dictated by Charles 1.56
As alluded to above, this predilection was not limited to theory,
and the civil magistrates of Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut did
more than merely present those who held views divergent from their
own with an intolerant ideological disposition. Indeed, consistent
with their own leanings and their colonial charters, the churches in
those colonies were established, or funded by the entirety of the
colonial populace, regardless of any particular individual's
membership status. 7 In sum, as Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence
Everson, 330 U.S. at 9-10 (citation omitted).
5 Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among theJustices: How Contemporary Debates
in Theology Can Help To Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by
the State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 433, 467 n.195 (1999) (quoting JOHN LELAND, THE
VIRGINIA CHRONICLE (1790), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN
LELAND 107 (L.F. Greene ed., G.W. Wood 1845)).
56 See KRAMNIcK & MOORE, supra note 37, at 46-47 (discussing the views of the civil
authorities of the Massachusetts Bay Colony).
57 See id. at 49 (likening these colonies to "theocrac[ies]"). Moreover, contrary to a
particular strain of popular opinion, conditions were similar in the southern colonies
as well, as described by Laura Underkuffler-Freund:
It has been said that in the southern colonies, religious rules were observed
more in the breach than in the practice. Most Revolutionary-Era laws,
however, reflected the intolerance that existed elsewhere. The South
Carolina Constitution of 1778 granted toleration to "[a]ll persons and
religious societies, who acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state
of reward and punishment, and that God is publicly to be worshipped"-a
formulation that seemed to include the protection of Jews and Catholics.
However, it further provided that "[It] he Christian Protestant religion shall be
deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the established religion
of this State," with "[a]Ill denominations of Protestants ... enjoy[ing] equal
religious and civil privileges." North Carolina denied public office to any
person, "who shall deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant
religion, or the divine authority of either the Old or New Testaments, or who
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Moore state:
The men and women who boarded the Arahella in 1630 with John
Winthrop, leaving England for Massachusetts Bay, believed that they
were repeating the biblical drama of Exodus.... Winthrop gave the
American Puritans their duty to construct a city on a hill. While this duty
was both civil and religious, its ultimate success depended upon the
power of the civil authorities to enforce religious correctness.5
Though dominant during the seventeenth century, this view was
not universal. Many colonists perceived the establishment of a state-
mandated religion by a group of individuals who had risked their lives
to cross a dangerous ocean in the name of freedom from religious
persecution as largely hypocritical. Dissenters challenged various
aspects of the civil-religious state, from the substance of the Puritans'
religious teachings to their insistence upon inextricably weaving
institutionalized religiousness into the civil order.
A particularly compelling example of such an individual-Roger
Williams-illustrates this latter reaction to the transplantation of the
Christian civil order and its characteristic intolerance from England to
America. Again, this is not to say that Williams's experience was
typical of seventeenth-century colonists, but it is exemplary in its
representation of the reformist Zeitgeist. Moreover, he was th nost
influential of the early religious dissenters, and as such, a focus upon
him is natural.
shall hold religious principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the
State.... " Georgia, in its Constitution of 1777, declared that all members of
the legislature "[shall] be of the Protestant religion."
Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Fundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WNrM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 886-87
(195) (quoting, respectively, S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 6 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LxxwS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES, Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3248, 3255-56 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXII, reprinted in 5
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2787, 2793; GA. CONT. OF 1777, art. VI, reprinted in 2
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 777, 779).
KRA.1%MNICK & MOORE, supra note 37, at 50.
"This is illustrated by the banishment of Anne Hutchinson for expressing a belief
in Antinomianism-the idea that the individual conscience is able to communicate
directly with God, and is supreme when doing so. "Antinomianism threatened the
Puritan colony because its advocates placed the spirit of God above the civil state and
above Biblical law itself." Paul Finkelman, Cultural Speech and Political Speech in
Historical Perspective, 79 B.U. L. REV. 717, 725 (1999) (reviewing DAVID M. RABBAN,
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTENYEARS (1997)).
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C. The Impact of Roger Williams on the Framers of the First Amendment
Williams's influence upon the First Amendment is important not
only in that it is the product of an early-American perspective. It is
also significant because Williams's ideas were those of a devoutly
religious individual and therefore may not be dismissed as the critique
of one at odds with Christianity generally. Indeed, his views were
firmly rooted in his own religious convictions, which dictated that "his
Christian God had fixed a narrow path of religious duty for his chosen
saints, a duty that required them to protect correct Christian practice
from worldly corruption, and.., the number of true Christians would
always be a small proportion of the population in any society...."'
Consequently, he rejected the concept of a nation under God as
"arrogant blasphemy."6'
Yet, for all of their controversial character, these ideas would have
remained mere abstract notions had no opportunity existed for their
application. But almost immediately upon arriving in Massachusetts
in 1630, Williams was presented with the occasion to assert these ideas
in a significant and divisive way.
Notably, his transatlantic voyage was itself largely impelled by the
overbearing close rule of his "ecclesiastical superiors in the person [s]
of bishops."62 Yet upon arriving in Massachusetts, Williams soon
realized that the civil-religious order was an impediment to genuine
religious freedom of the same genus as that with which he had been
confronted in England. One pair of commentators has described the
matter thus: "[Williams] had found in Massachusetts freedom from
the rule of ecclesiastical superiors ... but not what was to him the
other most important part of 'soul liberty,' freedom from interference
by the civil authority."'3
Williams had sought a place that had broken completely with the
"inadequately reformed Church of England" and that featured
religious tolerance in the form of civil nonpreferentialism among
religious orders.4 Yet Massachusetts Bay, as then constituted, was not
a place in which his ideals would be realized, as the colony was
60 KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 37, at 48.
61 Id. In full, Kramnick and Moore state that "(flor England or for Massachusetts
Bay to make a claim that it was a Christian polity, a civil government party to a divine
contract, was arrogant blasphemy." Id.
62 STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 35, at 13.
63 Id.
64 KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 37, at 46.
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steadfastly and officially Anglican. 6' As his disappointment festered,
Williams began to criticize vocally the civil establishment, and
ultimately was expelled from the colony by its magistrates. He fled to
Rhode Island in 1636, where he was able to implement his vision of
"seculariz[ing] the institutions of government and politics," and to
provide for pure religious liberty.6
Many scholars evaluate Williams's influence upon the substance of
the First Amendment Religion Clauses as significant,67 and view his
embrace of religious tolerance as entailing potentially similarly great
impact within the modem First Amendment discourse. 5 Yet others,
', See Arlin M. Adams & CharlesJ. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1559, 1563 (1989) ("The nonseparatist Puritans who founded the
Massachusetts Bay Colony still recognized the Anglican establishment and were less
tolerant than their Pilgrim brethren, setting up a theocentric commonwealth premised
on Old Testament law.").
" See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1867 (1833) (stating that Rhode Island was an exception to the prevalent
trend of Christianization of the civil authority); see also CURRY, supra note 31, at 19
("[The Rhode Island] settlements did live up to Williams's hopes for Providence
itself-that it would be a refuge for those who were distressed in conscience." (citing
S DNEY V.JAMES, COLONIAL RHODE ISLAND 1, 48-74 (1975))).
.7 See, e.g., K.AMNICK & MOORE, supra note 37, at 48 ("To praise Williams is not to
denigrateJohn Winthrop and other admirable seventeenth-century Puritan leaders of
the Massachusetts Bay Colony. But it is to remember why in 1787 Americans chose to
model their %iews more on the church-state ideas of Williams than on those of the
people who banished him to Rhode Island."); STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 35, at 15-
16 ("[Williams's principles upon which a religious pluralistic society can best survive
and flourish] were later to become the First Amendment declaration against laws
respecting any establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... ."); Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; W11hen God Speaks to a King- Faith,
Politici, Tax Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the Clinton Administration, 63 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 391, 421 (2000) ("[William] Penn and Williams established the
foundation for the proper relationship between faith and government in America and,
therefore, still merit our attention today.").
- See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1709,
1712 (2000) ("[Ojur nation's courts.., shoulder the task of implementing the
xision[] of... Roger Williams through interpreting the text of the First Amend-
ment."); Marcus Mumford, The Believer's First Amendment, 1999 BYU L. REV. 957, 974
(1999) (reviewing TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER
VILLMIMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998)) ("Hall concludes Separating Church and State
by providing an indication of how he expects a return to the thought of evangelical
passion and dissent, as expressed by Williams, will affect our modem interpretation of
both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses."); cf. Michael W. McConnell,
The Oigins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1409, 1453 (1990) ("Consistent with [his] more affirmative stance tou-ard religion
[than that displayed by Thomas Jefferson], Madison advocated ajurisdictional division
bet een religion and government based on the demands of religion rather than solely
on the interests of society."). In this sense, then, Madison may have been more like
Williams in his church-state leanings than is popularly conceived to be the case.
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such as Edward J. Eberle, contest the directness of Williams's
influence upon the Framers. 69
To the extent that such skeptical arguments are empirically
grounded, however, any lack of direct reliance should not be mistaken
for an overall lack of influence by Roger Williams. Even Eberle
continues: "Williams thus originated the evangelical strand of
separation that influenced the framing of the First Amendment
religious protections, complementing the more secular theories of
separation of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison."7 ° Indeed, the
problem for those who contest Roger Williams's influence is that his
ideas concerning religious toleration and the experiences that
produced them, because widely shared, were by the late eighteenth
century indelibly stamped upon American political and religious
consciousness. 71 Thus, it is logical to assert that his influence is visible
in the direct products of that mindset: the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
D. The Impact of the Ideas and Experiences of the Framers
on the Substance of the First Amendment
Although he drew heavily on the work of his intellectual
predecessors, James Madison was also influenced by his own ideas and
those of his American contemporaries. Perhaps Madison's views on
the proper relationship between church and state are best expressed
in his 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 7- a
work that has been referred to as "Madison's complete, though not his
only, interpretation of religious liberty."73 In this essay, he argued
60 It is possible that Williams's views, rooted in his own religious leanings, carried a
limited amount of direct, persuasive currency with the Framers. For instance, Eberle
states: "there is no direct evidence that Williams influenced overtly... Jefferson, or
Madison." Eberle, supra note 6, at 466; see also Mumford, supra note 68, at 967 (stating
that "efforts to demonstrate any sort of 'tutelage' from Williams to Madison... are far
from persuasive." (internal quotation omitted)).
70 Eberle, supra note 6, at 453.
71 See generally Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold
Niebuhr, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1567, 1580 n.55 (1995) (providing that Williams's views on
disestablishment exemplified those incorporated by the Framers into the First
Amendment).
72 See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
THE FORGING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM: SELECTED WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 299
(Saul K. Padovar ed., 1953) (offering a prime example of Madison's perspective on
disestablishment).
73 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 37 (1947) (Rutledge,J., dissenting). Justice
Rutledge adds that "the Remonstrance is at once the most concise and the most
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that:
religion must be left to each man's conscience and that cvil government
should remain aloof from religion so that religion and government
could flourish. Madison argued that collaboration between cil
government and religion degraded both and that attempts by civil
governments to impose religious conformity only led to strife and
bloodshed .
Moreover, the Remonstrance "is a broadside attack upon all forms
of 'establishment' of religion, both general and particular,
nondiscriminatoiN or selective."75 Perhaps the simplest, most profound
indication of the extent to which Madison favored separation is his
statement that the religious realm is necessarily "exempt from [the]
cognizance" .of the civil sphere.
Importantly, the Remonstrance was spurred by the intensification of
the "disestablishment" movement in Madison's native Virginia roughly
a decade after the signing of the Declaration of Independence."
Indeed, for all of the efforts of religious dissenters such as Roger
Williams and prominent Quaker leaders such as William Penn'7 who
ensured disestablishment for the colony of Pennsylvania, ) established
churches were common in late-eighteenth-century America.
Yet Virginia, which had established Anglicanism as its state
religion, was not a religiously homogeneous place. This period was
accurate statement of the views of the First Amendment's author concerning what is
'an establishment of religion.'" Id.
Ronald D. Wenkart, Prayer in School: Can a Solution Be Found?, 138 Educ. L. Rep.
5q7, 599 (1999).
7- Everon, 330 U.S. at 37 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Importantly, recent scholarship has questioned the completeness of the separation
preferred by Madison. See McConnell, supra note 68, at 1453 (stating that Madison
may have disfavored only established religion, while believing that neutral aid is
unproblematic). Indeed, Jefferson often is credited with being stricter in his
separation ideas. See id. at 1452 ("Madison possessed a far more sympathetic attitude
toward religion than did Jefferson."). Nonetheless, the Court has been reticent to
attribute to Madison the espousal of anything other than an absolute separation of
church and state. Sre Everson, 330 U.S. at 37-40 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (tracking
Madison's opposition to the establishment of religion).
,,, Madison, supra note 72, at 300.
7 So, Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRAcUSE L. REv.
971, 989 (1999) (delineating Madison's xiews on the separation of church and state).
SS Ev,'ron, 330 U.S. at 36 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (noting that the struggle
over Virginia's Assessment Bill reached its zenith in 1784-1785).
So John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
C, %titutional Experiment, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REN. 372, 394 (1996) (describing Penn's
xieiws and their place in Madisonian separation doctrine).
1 Se' id.
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marked by the proliferation of religious sects, and many, particularly
the sizable Presbyterian contingent," expressed their displeasure to
the Virginia legislature about the use of their tax dollars to support a
religious order not their own. Madison and Jefferson were both key
figures in the ultimately successful effort to render the "church tax"
voluntary, and Madison's Remonstrance was the primary weapon in this
fight against religious imposition."8
Yet this seminal essay was not the first instance in which James
Madison had considered the issue of how best to effectuate religious
liberty. In 1776, he had co-authored with George Mason the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, and he "is credited with changing it from a
mere statement of the principle of tolerance to the first official
legislative pronouncement that freedom of conscience and religion
are inherent rights of the individual.
' '4
In 1779, as a member of the Virginia General Assembly, Madison
lent his unabashed support to Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom, which embodied the arguments against the
"church tax" delineated above. Madison in fact penned the
Remonstrance both in support of this Bill and in opposition to the tax.
Thus, Madison's opposition to "every form and degree of official
relation between religion and civil authority" 6 had been well
conceived before the 1791 drafting of the First Amendment.
During the debate surrounding the ratification of that
Amendment, Madison argued for a separation of precisely the sort he
had advocated in his home state in years past. Nonetheless, there was
one notable difference between this debate and that which had
transpired in Virginia. Unlike the latter, the new constitutional
amendment entailed an important aspect of federalism, around which
revolves a wealth of recent debate concerning the meaning of the First
81 Madison himself was an Episcopalian. John T. Noonan, Jr., Commentary: The
Secular Search for the Sacred, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 642, 651 (1995).
82 See CHESTERJAMES ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 31-
32 (1964) (relating dissenting sects' opposition to the collection of large taxes to
support establishment).
,3 See generally Wenkart, supra note 74, at 599 (noting the role played by Madison
andJefferson in this conflict and describing the Remonstrance as an implement aimed at
securing liberty from the "church' tax").
84 Everson, 330 U.S. at 34 (RutledgeJ., dissenting).
85 See id. at 38 (Rutiedge, J., dissenting) ("The Remonstrance, stirring up a storm
of popular protest, killed the Assessment Bill .... With this, the way was cleared at last
for enactment ofJefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.").
86 Id. at 39 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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Amendment Religion Clauses.8' Despite his insistence upon
protecting the essential liberty of conscience through the separation
of the civil and religious realms, Madison was also a strong proponent
of the rights of the sovereign states vis-a-vis the federal government.
Thus, some have interpreted statements such as his declaration that
"It]here is not a shadow of right in the general government to
intermeddle with religion" s as evidence that he intended "the
Religion Clauses solely to assign jurisdiction over religious liberty
issues to the states,"'' and not as placing substantive federal limits on
cil-religious conjunction in the states.
Although this view has garnered significant support,"0 its reception
has not been uniformly hospitable."' Indeed, many constitutional law
scholars adhere to the view that the First Amendment places
substantive limits on governmental entanglement with religion."q'
,7 See. e'g., Steven G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism,
Sjdnhc i , and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273, 2282 (1999) (reviewing
AHIL REED A_\AR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998))
(lO1ur First Amendment... was not originally about libertarian individualism but...
xias instead a federalism provision."); David E. Steinberg, Gardening at Night: Religion
and Choic, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 987 (1999) (reviewing STEVEN D. SMITH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (1995)) (discussing interpretation theories as they relate to the Religion
Clauses).
Debate by James Madison at the Convention of Virginia (June 12, 1788), in 3
TiIE DEB XTES IN THE SEVERLX- STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDEtRAL CONSTITIUTION 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1896).
Steinberg, sufra note 87, at 1002; see also Comment, supra note 31, at 767
("Madison ... left it to the states to adopt such measures regarding religion as they saw
fit, provided only that they, did not thereby infringe the rights of conscience.").
S;e Calabresi, supra note 87, at 2282 (putting forth the theory that Madison
Xiewed the clauses as a federalism provision). Moreover, the idea that the Bill of Rights
applied only to the federal government was a mainstay of American jurisprudence
until the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments from 1865 to 1870. See generally
Barton v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833) (holding the Bill of Rights
inapplicable to the states).
S , Steinberg, supra note 87, at 1002-03 n.76 ("Madison's terse statement that
the federal government could not 'intermeddle with religion' is susceptible to
interpretations other than the jurisdictional interpretation advocated by Professor
Smith."). Steinberg goes on to declare that "It]he statements cited by Professor Smith
are ambiguous, and subject to more than one plausible interpretation. At best, such
statements provide limited support for Professor Smith's thesis that the Framers did
not enact some substantive principle when they adopted the Religion Clauses." Id. at
1003.
S, id. at 1002 (describing the substantive significance attributed by many to the
First Amendment). It is also possible that such a stance was the product of a political
strategy aimed at securing the votes of the large Baptist contingent of the Virginia
electorate, whose support at the polls proved crucial in Madison's defeat of James
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Moreover, even if the First Amendment Religion Clauses were
intended to be jurisdictional only, this does not mean that Madison
favored a Christian state, or even a derivative thereof, as some
purport.93 Here it is worth emphasizing that Jefferson's ideas also
played a large part in framing the First Amendment, and Jefferson's
advocacy of strict separation is unquestioned." But even if we are to
scrutinize Madison in particular, we find that the view of individual
religious liberty expressed in the Remonstrance is reconcilable with his
strong notion of federalism. While he arguably might have intended
to indicate in the First Amendment that the states should be left "free
to deal with the citizen in religious matters in whatever manner they
chose,"95 as long as such measures did not "infringe the rights of
conscience, 96  his conception of complete separation as the
appropriate nature of that choice appears clear. 7 Indeed, this was the
Monroe for a seat in the first House of Representatives. See McConnell, supra note 68,
at 1477 (describing the campaign strategy employed by Madison).
93 See, e.g., M.G. "Pat" Robertson, Squeezing Religion Out of the Public Square-The
Supreme Court, Lemon, and the Myth of the Secular Society, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF Rrs. J.
223, 270-71 (1995) (noting that the clauses' text does not support the view that the)
summed up Madison's views on church-state relationships).
94 See McConnell, supra note 68, at 1452 (crediting Jefferson with a more rigid
stance on the issue).
05 See William F. Cox, Jr., The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and Its
Application to Education, 13 REGENT U. L. REv. 111, 140 (2000-2001) ("The fact that
Madison's initial First Amendment proposition was to be inserted into Section 9 of
Article I, which deals with limits on Congress, rather than into Section 10, which deals
with restrictions on the States, further substantiates the contention that Amendment
was not intended to apply against the States.")
Comment, supra note 31, at 767-69.
The nonpreferentialist school is mistaken....
.... Rather, the [Establishment] Clause was intended to prevent the
establishment of a class of religion or even of religion generically. Thus, it
does not mean only that a single church cannot be joined to the state, but it
also means that no set of religions can be joined to the state.
Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REv. 807,
822-23 (1999).
The Framers of the Religion Clauses certainly did not consciously intend to
permit nonpreferential aid, and those of them who thought about the
question probably intended to forbid it. In fact, substantial evidence suggests
that the Framers expressly considered the question and that they believed that
nonpreferential aid would establish religion.
Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27
WM. & MARrL. REv. 875, 878 (1986).
97 See William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the
Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1191, 1203 (1990) ("Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance indeed suggests a push toward more complete separation in
Virginia.").
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very point of his Remonstrance, targeted directly at the Virginia
legislature.
The argument that Madison in fact sought something short of an
absolute separation as a means of benefiting religion generally, that is,
without impeding any individual's "freedom of conscience,"8 mistakes
such a scheme for his actual goal of defending religious liberty via
complete separation. " As Professor Monsma states: "[i]n defending
religious liberty, and church-state separation as the means to attain it,
Madison consistently argued that such separation would be good for
religion as well as for government.,,""' Indeed, as will be argued below,
Madison recognized that an absolute separation is essential if religious
freedom is to be ensured. This conception of the Religion Clauses as
substantive guarantees of governmental noninvolvement with religion
was secured by the incorporation of the clauses into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the mid-twentieth century,
thereby rendering them applicable to the states.""
In sum, the First Amendment was the product of ideas drawn
from the natural-rights intellectual tradition. Synthesized by the
"common unifying force of Madison's life, thought and
sponsorship,". 2 these notions find a unitary voice in the opening to
the Bill of Rights. Whether intended as a means of protecting religion
from civil authority, individual rights from ecclesiastical power, or, as
is more likely, both, the First Amendment prohibits any governmental
entity from declaring one denomination as its official religion. More
- Mark G. Valencia, Comment, Take Care of Me When I Am Dead: An Examination of
American Churth-State Development and the Future of American Religious Liberty, 49 SMU L.
RLv. 1579, 1581 (1996).
- For one of many possible examples, consider:.
[N]either the text of the Establishment Clause nor its historical background
support the view that the Clause merely summed up Madison's andJefferson's
vieus regarding church-state relationships, much less the view that the Clause
require., a complete separation between religion and government prohibiting
all government aid to or encouragement of religion. Certainly the first several
generations of American legislators (including those who actually drafted the
YAmendment) did not think that government aid to or encouragement of
religion was inconsistent with the Religion Clauses.
Rbertson, supra note 93, at 270-71. In fact, the Framers likely believed that the
Religion Clauses themselves encouraged religion, but that they did so by preventing
the govermnent from impacting negatively upon it in any direct way.
MONS.U, supra note 6, at 96.
Sre Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to
enact... laws.. [that violate the First Amendment Religion Clauses].").
),., E~erson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,39 (1947) (Rutledge,J., dissenting).
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generally, the Amendment mandates the complete separation of
church and state, 3 thereby rendering a state preference for religion
generally equally problematic. It is these principles that necessarily
underpin any wise and jurisprudentially defensible approach to the
Religion Clauses, and that must guide our appraisal of the questions
presented within the context of preferential zoning.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY-BASED
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS
LAND USES FROM NEUTRAL, GENERALLY
APPLICABLE ZONING REGULATIONS
I will focus primarily on the policy-based justification for the
maxim that neutral zoning laws may not exclude religious uses from
residential districts, namely that such uses are inherently beneficial to
the community. The force of any line of reasoning that takes issue
with this justification would be virtually nil, however, if there existed a
second, legitimate basis for curtailing the power of zoning laws,
namely the Free Exercise Clause. I will therefore argue briefly that
the Clause imposes no such limitation.
A. The Free Exercise Clause as a PotentialJustification for the
Exemption of Religious Land Uses from Neutral,
Generally Applicable Zoning Regulations
We may start from the baseline proposition that, as a matter of
Free Exercise jurisprudence, mosques, temples, churches, and the like
may be subjected to neutral, generally applicable laws.'6-, Given this,
those who contend that the Free Exercise Clause °' mandates the
103 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963) ("'[Tihe object [of the
Religion Clauses] was broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense.
It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or
support for religion.'" (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32)).
104 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990);
see infra text accompanying notes 106-07 (discussing free exercise jurisprudence prior
to 1990).
I05 1 am referring here to the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution.
This, of course, is not technically the only other possible source of such a doctrine.
Such preference could be predicated upon a provision of a state constitution that is
more expansive in its free exercise protections than the federal version. That a state's
constitution may be more protective of individual rights in this sense is undisputed. See
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (Wash. 1992) (declaring
that such expansiveness is unproblematic). To the extent that this protection rises to
the level of a state-backed, institutionalized preference for religion generally, however,
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exemption of religious uses from neutral, generally applicable zoning
regulations must necessarily defend the following proposition: the
Free Exercise Clause draws a line between zoning regulations with
which a religious use is able to comply and those that make demands
that the use is unable to meet. Because compliance with pertinent
zoning regulations is a necessary precursor to the development or use
of a structure (in the absence of a variance sanctioning
noncompliance therewith), a group that is unable to conform its place
of worship to the mandates of a zoning law will be prohibited from
using the subject property for its desired religious purpose. This law,
they would conclude, may therefore be said to impede the members'
exercise of their religious beliefs, in violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.
This sort of argument, although interesting, simply finds no
support in current Free Exercise jurisprudence. Until 1990,
proponents of such a view would have had some legal foundation for
the position; the governing authority was the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Sherbert v. Verner, which expounded a strict-scrutiny test for
governmental actions that substantially burdened religion."' Thus,
unless such actions were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental purpose, Sherbert deemed them violative of the Free
Exercise Clause. But in 1990, the Court drastically shifted direction,
careening down what may be considered a substantially pro-regulatory
avenue. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
Sherbert's compelling interest test was functionally abandoned, as the
Court reaffirmed that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes) .'',7
Thus, "a claimant whose religious practice is burdened by a facially
'generally applicable' and 'neutral' law can obtain relief only by
carrying the heavy burden of proving that there is an unconstitutional
motivation behind the law and, thus, that it is not truly neutral or
it violates the federal Establishment Clause. Thus, such preferences in the context of
zoning are not legitimized as based on a highly expansive state analog to the federal
Free Exercise Clause. See supra note 21 (discussing this line of reasoning).
l'. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513
(1997) (describing the Slerbert approach to the Free Exercise Clause as asking whether
a law substantially burdens a religious practice and whether there is a compelling
interestjustif'ing the burden).
1-17 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982) (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment)).
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generally applicable.""5 Smith arose within the context of a criminal
statute, and the Smith Court was unambiguous in holding that because
the public health, safety, and welfare were at issue and because the
Free Exercise Clause was the sole constitutional basis for Smith's
claim, the state's regulatory interest simply outweighed that of the
respondent.'0 9 Subsequently, the applicability of the holding in Smith
and the expansive notion of regulatory propriety it implicitly entails
have been routinely confirmed within the civil context of zoning."'
Thus, although "the Court left open the viability of free exercise
attacks on government actions.., that violate the first amendment in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, zoning has not
been interpreted as such a vulnerable area."2
The notion that the Free Exercise Clause precludes the de facto
exclusion of religious land uses from residential or other districts by
neutral, generally applicable zoning laws is thus impossible to
reconcile with the unambiguous standard governing modern
interpretations of the First Amendment.' 13 Indeed, to argue to the
108 Von G. Keetch & Matthew K. Richards, The Need for Legislation to Enshrine Fee
Exercise in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 725, 727 (1999).
109 See generally Ala. & Coushatta Tribes v. Trs. of Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817
F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (addressing the holding of Smith, stating that
"the state's interest in regulating criminal conduct, thereby protecting the public
health, safety, and welfare, was so overwhelming that a free exercise challenge,
standing alone, could not be maintained").110
See Mount Elliott Cemetary Ass'n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir.
1999) (adjudicating the Free Exercise challenge to a zoning regulation under the
Smith standard); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 (8th
Cir. 1991) (same); Rector, Wardens & Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's
Church v. City of NewYork, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).
I Cornerstone Bible Church, 948 F.2d at 472.
12 Indeed, the shift manifested in Smith was so extreme that Congress responded
with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488. In passing the RFRA,
Congress reinstated the compelling governmental interest test eschewed by Smith by
requiring that a generally applicable law placing a "substantial burden" on the free
exercise of religion must be justified by a "compelling governmental interest" and must
employ the "least restrictive means" of furthering that interest. Religious Freedom
Restoration Act §§ 2-3; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997)
(describing the purpose of the RFRA). Importantly from a current jurisprudential
vantage, however, the Court declared the RFRA to be an excessive, unconstitutional
assertion of the remedial power possessed by Congress pursuant to section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that the Act could not "be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." Id. at 532. Thus, no
statutory provision currently casts a shadow of doubt upon the subservience of free
exercise to truly neutral, generally applicable regulations, as articulated in Smith.
113 The opinion of the Fourth Circuit in Christ College, Inc. v. Board of Supervisu s,
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contrary-that is, that neutral zoning regulations may not serve to
prevent a group from employing a piece of property for any religious
purpose it pleases-is actually to take issue with the notion that such
uses should be subject to generally applicable regulations at all, as a
regulation that entails no incentive for compliance is a functional
nonentity. While this might have been a viable reading during the
Sherbert era, the strict-scrutiny approach has been obviated by Smith.
114
B. PolicT-Based Reasoning as a PotentialJustification for the
Exclusion of Religious Land Uses from Neutral,
Generally Applicable Zoning Regulations
Given the shortcomings of the free exercise argument delineated
above, if zoning regulations are to be found impermissible when they
functionally exclude religious uses, the holding may not be viably
predicated upon that Clause. Instead, policy-based reasoning rooted
in a preference for religion would necessarily inform such a doctrine,
and this is where the First Amendment is a doctrinal impediment.
One explicit articulation of this pro-religious, policy-based
reasoning was laid down in Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, in
which the New York Court of Appeals declared that "[a] church...
No. 90-2406, 1991 WL 179102, at *4 (4th Cir. 1991), is particularly instructive here. In
that case, the court held that zoning laws could theoretically violate the Free Exercise
Clause by absolutely (i.e., explicitly) prohibiting religious uses on any property or by
pointedly curtailing "particular uses having special religious significance." Id. at *4.
However, zoning regulations of that sort would not be truly neutral, as alluded to
aboxe. S, Keetch & Richards, supra note 108, at 727 (noting that a claimant must
prove that a zoning law which purportedly violates the Free Exercise Clause "is not
truly neutral or generally applicable"); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993) (holding that a regulation that is not
generally applicable must advance compelling interests and be narrowly tailored in
pursuit of these interests in order to curtail religious practice). The Christ College court
concluded that "[tihe fact that local regulations limit the geographical options of a
religious [use] ... does not prove that any party's right to free exercise is thereby
burdened." Chiit College, 1991 WL 179102, at *4.
Interestingly, the court did state that "[t]here must at least be some nexus between
the government regulation-here, a zoning law-and impairment of ability to carry
out a religious mission [for the law to violate the Free Exercise Clause]," id. at *4,
thereby implying that laws with which a congregation is unable or possibly unwilling to
comply may be unconstitutional. To the extent that this is an accurate reading of the
Christ Clhg0, holding, however, it is at odds ith Smith. Indeed, as indicated by the
abo.c argument concerning the functional nullification of the zoning laws as applied
to religious uses that would stem from such a doctrine, such a holding would eviscerate
the core holding of Smith and must therefore be incorrect as a matter of law.
III Sea Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (holding that neutral laws of general applicability may
apply to religious land uses without violating the Free Exercise Clause).
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[is, in itself,] clearly in furtherance of the public morals and general
welfare. The church is the teacher and guardian of morals,"" and "'is
considered an aid to the general welfare. ' ' ." While the courts of only
a few states have explicitly articulated this line of reasoning,"7 it is
implicit in the decisions of numerous otherjurisdictions that are often
couched in free exercise terms.'" Yet their use of free exercise
language demonstrates that even these tribunals have recognized the
inadequacy of such policy-based lines of reasoning.
As evidence of the inclusion of an implicit, pro-religious bias in
the court-fashioned (and statutory) limits on zoning vis-a-vis religious
land uses, consider, for example, the following statement: "where
private schools [as opposed to parochial schools] are involved...
exclusion may well be unrelated to the public health, safety, morals, or
the general welfare, and therefore not be reasonably related to the
police power.""9 Parochial schools, by contrast, have often been
treated as excludable only where such action is reasonably related to
the police power."°  Indeed, this notion that churches, temples,
synagogues, and the like are entitled to disparately favorable
treatment as compared to secular land uses is widespread.
2 '
15 136 N.E.2d 827, 836-37 (N.Y. 1956) (citing State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v.Joseph,
39 N.E.2d 515 (1942)).
,16 Id. at 837 (quoting Roman Catholic Archbishop of Diocese of Oregon v. Baker,
15 P.2d 391, 395 (1932)).
17 See Kali Bari Temple v. Bd. of Adjustment, 638 A.2d 839, 843 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994) (noting that "a church use is inherently beneficial"); Trs. of Union
Coll. v. Members of the Schenectady City Council, 656 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997) (describing the preferred status with respect to the enforceability of zoning
laws afforded to religious and educational institutions, as they "are, by their very
nature, 'clearly in furtherance of the public morals and general welfare.' (quoting
Diocese of Rochesterv. Planning Bd., 136 N.E.2d 827, 836 (N.Y. 1956))).
118 See, e.g., Grace Cmty. Church v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 615 A.2d 1092,
1103 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that the right of freedom of religion may
trump certain zoning restrictions).
83 AM.JUR. 2D Zoning§ 427 (1992).
120 See id. (noting that public and parochial schools are treated differently on
occasion with respect to zoning controls).
121 See, e.g., Grace Cmty. Church, 615 A.2d at 1104 (holding that the local zoning
commission was required to grant the plaintiff a special permit based upon its religious
nature); City of Chi. Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church &
Ministries, Inc., 707 N.E.2d 53, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) ("Zoning ordinances ... are
presumptively valid .... But different presumptions arise when zoning ordinances
implicate constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion. Under these
circumstances, the ordinance does not enjoy presumptive validity and the burden of
[proving that the regulation is related to the public health, safety and morals] shifts to
the city." (citations omitted)); Chaminade Coll. Preparatory, Inc. v. City of Creve
Coeur, 956 S.W.2d 440, 441-42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("'Any regulatory power a
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How could that be? Certainly these courts' purported reliance on
the Free Exercise Clause must be pretextual. The import of Smith,
which has been unambiguously rendered applicable within the zoning
context, ' is that the standard for determining whether a particular
governmental regulation violates the Free Exercise Clause is not
whether the law furthers the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.
That sort of compelling interest analysis is precisely the interpretive
mode expounded in Sherbert, which was rejected by Smith."' In atelling passage, the Smith Court stated:
[Ilf "compelling interest" really means what it says ... many laws will not
meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting
anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's
diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress
none of them. Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up
of people of almost every conceivable religious preference," and
precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we
municipality may have over churches is purely for safety regulation.'" (quoting Vill.
Lutheran Church v. City of Ladue, 935 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997))); First
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (Wash. 1992) ("We hold that the
City's interest in preservation of esthetic and historic structures is not compelling and
it does not justify, the infringement of First Covenant's right to freely exercise religion.
The possible loss of significant architectural elements is a price we must accept to
guarantee the paramount right of religious freedom.").
),- Str supra note 110 (listing cases employing the Smith standard ithin the
context of zoning); cf First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. Collier County, 775
F. Supp. 383, 386 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[Zjoning ordinances of general application are
not aimed at impeding religion and, 'given zoning's historical function in protecting
public health and welfare, and the incidental nature of the asserted burden on
religion, the essential effect of zoning laws is clearly secular.'" (quoting Grosz v. Miami
Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 738 (11th Cir. 1983)).
S e Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and
Pdigious Libert 'vAfter City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REXr. 79, 80 ("The Court...
formally renounce[d] the Sherbert test as the general rule in religious exemption
cases."). While the Court did not state that Sherbert was explicitly overruled, the
standard articulated in Smith serves as the functional equivalent to such a declaration.
The Smith court was forthcoming in stating that if what it deemed a "hybrid situation"
uere present, where the freedom of religion was infringed along with another
substantive constitutional right like freedom of speech or the press, then the First
Amendment might bar the application of a neutral law of general applicability. See
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990)
(delineating examples of constitutional rights). For purposes of this Comment, I have
assumed that no such hybrid situation is at issue; in other words, that the problem is
simply the conflict between a religious use and neutral zoning laws. To the extent that
such a situation did arise, for example, that zoning laws functionally precluded the
publishing of a religious newspaper, I suspect-though it exceeds the scope of this
Comment to argue this point thoroughly-that this would not serve to reinvigorate the
Sherbert standard, as the Court seems fairly interested in effectuating the notion that
religious uses are neither more nor less desirable than others.
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cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to
the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect
an interest of the highest order. The rule respondents favor would open
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from ciic
obligations of almost every conceivable kind .... 124
Smith thus precludes insistence upon such a relationship between
the regulation in question and the public welfare, or any sort of




Because Smith so clearly holds that the Free Exercise Clause does
not require such preferential treatment, the insistence upon
bestowing uniquely preferential treatment upon religious uses must
be the product of a belief that such uses are simply different from
others, in a positive sense. This conflict, however, highlights precisely
the sense in which the First Amendment does speak to such doctrinal
developments. Put in the simplest possible terms, the Establishment
Clause absolutely precludes the institutionalized preference for
religion over irreligion. 26  Explicit and implicit preferences for
religious land uses, therefore, violate the Establishment Clause.
When courts fashion such pro-religious doctrines, claiming that
the First Amendment (specifically the Free Exercise Clause) supports
their endeavors, they stretch the provision beyond its legitimate
bounds. Contrarily, courts ignore the very aspect of that Amendment,
the Establishment Clause, that does possess teeth in this particular
context.
C. The Cultural and Historical Bases for, and the Current Status of
Pro-Religious Bias in ZoningJurisprudence
This Part delineates the origins of this favorable view of religion
generally, the ways in which this notion has undergone a genuinely
profound transformation over the course of American history, and the
nature and scope of its modem jurisprudential manifestations. This
discussion is particularly important because the problem of "religious
zoning" is but one episode in an extended clash between the
ecclesiastical and secular realms in American society. Thus, to
understand the contours of this broader conflict is to be able to view
124 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
25 But see supra note 123 (discussing "hybrid situations").
120 See sources cited supra note 6 (listing authorities that support the proposition
that the government cannot prefer religion to secularism).
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the subject matter of this Comment in light of its broad socio-cultural
import, as well as to understand its more finite constitutional
implications. Indeed, both of these considerations render "religious
zoning" an especially seminal issue in modem America.
As discussed above, the United States was founded by individuals
who were devout in their respective faiths, and who, no doubt, viewed
religious devotion as the mark of a morally righteous individual and a
healthy society. While I have argued that James Madison intended to
create a complete barrier between church and state, it is worth
reiterating here the suggestion that he did so as a means of protecting
religious liberty. It would be implausible to contend that this pro-
religious stance was not largely incorporated into the American
mindset for decades and, it would appear, centuries to come.
However, by the late nineteenth century, the United States began
to experience a trend which continues to be reflected today in both its
culture and laws: a significant, yet uneasy and incomplete
secularization."-" The origins of this shift may be conceived of as part
of
a manifestation of the influence of romanticism in American culture. The
term "romanticism" is used here to refer to a spiritual transformation in
nineteenth-century America-a reconfiguration of the relationship between
the sacred and the secular in a society buffeted by political revolution,
religious awakenings, and industrial growth. In this unsettling environment,
American romantics struggled to "save traditional concepts, schemes, and
values which had been based on the relation of the Creator to his creature
and creation, but to reformulate them within the prevailing two-term system
of subject and object, ego and non-ego, the human mind or consciousness
and its transactions ith nature."12
17 See Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism:
Resunecting the Value of Love in Contemporay Jurisprudence; 82 GEO. LJ. 1431, 1434
(1994) ("The development of Western liberal secularism has relegated religious
discourse to a subordinate status among the otherwise legitimate views of what the
common good entails."); Hamilton, supra note 96, at 838 ("Religion may have chosen
to go behind the scenes in this republican democracy throughout the course of over
two hundred years... .");James D. Hunter, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of Modern
Pluralism, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE 54 (James D. Hunter & Os
Guinness eds., 1990) (noting the increasing prevalence of secular humanism in
American society); Michael W. McConnell, VWhy Is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21
CxiDOZO L. REv. 1243, 1257 (2000) ("American liberalism under[went a]
transormation, from a set of ideas rooted in Christian theology and congenial to
religious institutions to an ideology hostile to or suspicious of religion, at least in its
more common traditional forms."); Michael R. O'Neill, Comment, Government's
Denigration of Religion: Is God the Victim of Discrimination in Our Public Schools?, 21 PEPP.
L. REV. 477, 486 (1994) ("[T]here can be no doubt that America has undergone a
rapid secularization process.... .").
"1 Susanna L. Blumenthal, Law and the Creative Mind, 74 CHL-KENT L. RE-v. 151,
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This is not to say that America was or is not a religious place;
rather, the point is merely to highlight the development of a cultural
order featuring distinct spheres of thought and activity, with religion
no longer the lens through which all aspects of sociopolitical life are
perceived.
This general trend toward secularization was particularly
pronounced during the 1960s, a time marked by prevalent popular
distrust of authority of all sorts: governmental, parental, and
religious. It was such that "[b]eginning in the 1970s ... several
scholars, including Andrew Greeley and David Martin, looking at
evidence from the United States, began to question the 'death of God'
and the 'rise of the secular city.''
129
Paradoxically, however, the source of these thinkers' interest in
the subject was
growing evidence that American society was becoming less, rather than
more, secular. Church membership was increasing not declining. In
1976, a born-again Baptist, Jimmy Carter, was elected President and
Operation Rescue and other religious organizations were responding
publicly to abortion and creationism. Millions of Americans were tuning
in to televangelical religious programs such as Jim and Tammy Bakker's
Praise the Lord cable network, as well as the programs ofJerry Falwell of
the Moral Majority, Oral Roberts, Pat Robertson, Jimmy Swaggert, and
others.3 '
At first glance, this may appear contradictory-a trend of
secularization coupled with heightened religious participation-and
to a substantial degree, it is. American society had come to a point
where secular pursuits had begun to dominate public life, yet the
American people were becoming increasingly involved in religion.
The resultant confuision, hesitancy, and intrapersonal and social
156-58 (1998) (quoting M.H. ABRAMS, NATURAL SUPERNATURALISM: TRADITION AND
REVOLUTION IN ROMANTIC LITERATURE 13 (1971)).
129 Rebecca R. French, Lamas, Oracles, Channels, and the Law: Reconsidering Religion
and Social Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 505, 512 (1998). It is also probably worth
noting here that in 1971, the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), handed
down a markedly antiecclesiastical Establishment Clause test:
Lemon is castigated by its critics as an excessively separationist decision that
overemphasizes the impregnability of the "wall of separation" between church
and state. Critics who take this view also complain that the test (at least as
applied) is often too rigid and inflexible in its prohibition of government
accommodation of religion, so that it becomes ultimately hostile to the role of
religion in American life.
Mark C. Rahdert, A Jurisprudence of Hope: Justice Blackmun and the Freedom of Religion, 22
HAMINE L. REv. 1, 74 (1998).
130 French, supra note 129, at 512-13.
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conflict, where the state and religion brushed against one another,
were virtually inevitable.
This phenomenon has been replicated in the legal arena. If the
law lagged temporally behind in its own secularization, as possibly
indicated by the fact that the Supreme Court's first major
proclamation concerning the Establishment Clause, Everson v. Board of
Education, was not handed down until 1947,' it stayed a parallel
course. Given that law is by its nature the product of social necessity
and circumstance,"' we should not find its reflection of the
phenomenon of secularization surprising. In fact, Smith itself may well
be perceived, from a socio-legal perspective, as a significant step in
this secularization process.
Yet just as America was incomplete in its move away from a wholly
religiously infused social order, by the 1970s the law of church and
state was marked by uncertainty and hesitance. Thus, both the
general culture within the United States and the law it spawned
exhibited signs of being immersed in a spiritual-ideological quagmire.
Indeed, just as the interest in the "death of God"' was provoked by
what outwardly signaled an ecclesiastical resurgence, jurisprudential
manifestations of the process of secularization were juxtaposed against
clear doctrinal embodiments of a perception of religion as being tied
to the public welfare.
A particularly stark, noteworthy example of this sort of uncertain
shift in the direction of secularization may be found within the
context of late twentieth-century Michigan zoning jurisprudence. In
Congregation Dovid Ben Nuchim v. City of Oak Park, decided in 1972, the
Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
[T]he [Michigan] Supreme Court made clear that religion is accorded a
favored status in our society. In so doing, the Court held that a zoning
11 See Brady, supra note 55, at 440 ("In 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education, the
Court squarely addressed the meaning of the Establishment Clause for the first time.").
) 11I mean here simply that when communities are sufficiently small and close-knit,
the maintenance of social order may be achieved through the enforcement of
informal, community-based behavioral norms. It is only when society and the
interpersonal relationships between members thereof become complex and weaken
that those norms lose their potency, and it is only then that formal law is a necessary
instrumentality in the structuring of social relations. See generally ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHouT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DispuTES (1991)
(arguing that people often resolve disputes cooperatively without regard to the laws
that goxern those disputes); Cook, supra note 127, at 1437 ("[T]he pluralism that has
alwa)s characterized social life in America has become more and more difficult to deny
in intellectual life.").
I" French, supra note 129, at 512.
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ordinance which operated to exclude churches from an entire village
was in direct contradiction to the Constitutional provision setting forth
the necessity to good government of religion, morality and knowledge.
As such, the ordinance was not presumed valid and was found void.
In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the use of land for a church is
recognized as bearing a real, substantial, and beneficial relationship to
the public health, safety, and general welfare so as to be accorded ao • 1341
preferred status.
Just two years later, however, the Michigan Supreme Court
announced a doctrinal shift in Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights,' as it
declared: "[i]nsofar as decisions of the Court of Appeals are based
solely on the concept of 'favored or preferred use' and the attendant
shifting of burden of proof, they are hereby overruled. Plaintiffs must
bear the burden of proof in attacking the constitutionality of [zoning]
ordinance [s] .'136
The interesting aspect of Kropf however, is that despite its explicit
rejection of the proposition that religious uses are preferred in
relation to secular ones, the court went on to hold that the total
exclusion of places of worship would necessarily be justified through
the fulfillment of a "heavy burden" by the governmental entity
responsible for the exclusion .' Apparently satisfied that its approach
(drawing a line between the complete exclusion of religious uses and
their reasonable regulation) was logical, the court actually
contradicted itself. How can a place of worship be denied a preferred
status, yet be subject upon its total exclusion to a level of review not
afforded to other uses not considered to be such an integral part of
the "'spirit and genius of our free institutions and system of
government and the traditions of the American people?""3' I submit
that it cannot.
As demonstrated by the Michigan experience, while there has
been fairly marked movement toward secularization in the de jure
14 199 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (citing Mooney v. Viii. of Orchard
Lake, 53 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Mich. 1952)). Interestingly, however, the provision of the
Michigan Constitution upon which the Congregation court relied remains unchanged.
See MICH. CoNsr. art. 8, § 1 ("[R]eligion, morality and knowledge being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged."). This, at least upon a prima facie evaluation, appears in
and of itself to constitute a clearly worded, institutionalized preference for religion
over irreligion in violation of the federal Establishment Clause.
135 215 N.W.2d 179 (Mich. 1974).
136 Id. at 186.
137 Id. at 185.
M Id. (quoting AMooney, 53 N.W.2d at 310).
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sense, the courts have been unwilling to effectuate such a shift in fact.
American culture, both civil and legal, has grappled with conflicting
historical and contemporary norms for religion, and this tension is
reflected in the evolving status of the traditional preference for
religious land uses.
Importantly, both this conflict and the preference that aided in its
creation were present in 1990 when the Supreme Court handed down
Smith. In overturning Sherbert's compelling interest test, Smith, as
applied in the zoning context,:" signaled a dramatic shift in favor of
regulatory control in an already unsteady balance that had existed
between the doctrinal preference for places of worship and the zoning
laws that regulated them. But many courts have balked at simply
doing away with the institutionalized favoritism for religion that had
for so long occupied an important, if doctrinally illegitimate,' role in
the law of their respective jurisdictions. After all, consistent with the
theme of law reflecting social circumstance, America was a religious
place in 1990."' Thus, the modern preference for religious uses is a
remnant of its historical antecedent, the notion that an elevated status
for religion is rightfully manifested in zoning doctrine.
As stated above, however, the problem with this reasoning is that
the Establishment Clause simply does not permit a state-sponsored
preference for religion over irreligion at all, much less does it allow
such favoritism to guide the development of judicial doctrine."'4 This
I.,e supra notes 110, 122 (listing the cases that employ the Smith standard in the
context of zoning).
'" Sre Krctpf 215 N.W.2d at 185 (implicitly displaying such favoritism immediately
after repudiating its doctrinal legitimacy).
II See William P. Marshall, The Culture of Belief and the Politics of Religion, Lw &
CON-TEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 453, 459 (citing church membership within
the United States at sixty-five percent for 1990).
11- See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[A] governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion is forbidden by
the First Amendment." (citing Wallace v. Jaffrey, 472 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1985))); see also
Bd. of Educ. of Kir)asJoel Mill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) ("[A]
principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause ... [is] that government should not
prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion."); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 612 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("The challengers argue that, as originally
understood by the Framers, '[t]he Establishment Clause did not require government
neutrality betw'een religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government
from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion.' While a case has been made for
this position, it is not so convincing as to warrant reconsideration of our settled
law.... " (quotingJaffry, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting))); Christopher A.
Hoffman, Note, The Future of School Vouchers for Religious Academies After Jackson v.
Benson, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1083, 1099 n.158 (1999).
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is so not only in the abstract and in light of the history delineated
above, but moreover, it is also impermissible in view of the
interpretive stances taken on the Establishment Clause by the current
members of the United States Supreme Court. When we examine the
current Court and the views held by each Justice concerning the
Clause, it is clear that the preference for religion over irreligion as
manifested in an explicit or implicit partiality toward ecclesiastical
land uses should be held by a majority to constitute a First
Amendment violation. 4 3  In a comprehensive survey of the Justices'
varying approaches to the Establishment Clause, Lisa Langendorfer,
after noting the de facto demise of the Lemon test,'" ultimately
concludes thatJustice O'Connor is left "in the middle, a place that has
become quite familiar to her.""'5
Justice O'Connor favors an "endorsement" test whereby
governmental action that has the effect of creating a "symbolic
union" 6 between state authority and "religion,"" as perceived by the
143 See generally Lisa Langendorfer, Comment, Establishing a Pattern: An Analsis of
the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudenee 33 U. RIcH. L. REv. 705, 707-23
(1999) (giving historical and current overviews of the Court's jurisprudential
approaches in the context of the Establishment Clause).
144 See id. at 708 (stating that although the Lemon test has yet to be formally
overruled, it has been functionally abandoned by most of the justices, as it has been
considered overly "hostil[e] toward religion"); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971) (implementing a test consisting of the following three parts: (I)
does the measure in question have a secular purpose?; (2) does it have a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion?; and (3) does it involve an excessive
entanglement with religion?).
14, Langendorfer, supra note 143, at 725. Her analysis, in fuller form, is as follows:
At one end of the spectrum, the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Thomas are unlikely to find a violation of the Establishment Clause in any
case absent direct government coercion. Justice Kennedy is one step closer to
the middle in that he would find a violation where there is indirect coercion,
if the coercion is obvious and perhaps directed at school-aged children. At
the other end of the spectrum is Justice Souter, who would find a violation in
any case showing favoritism to a particular religion or to religion generally. In
his opinion, anything short of complete neutrality is unacceptable. Justice
Stevens is also likely to find Establishment Clause violations due to the
presumption he would apply against the government in the cases of religious
displays on public property. Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer seem to fit
somewhere toward this side of the spectrum, although it is unclear exactly
where they stand.
This leaves Justice O'Connor in the middle, a place that has become quite
familiar to her.
Id. at 724-25.
146 Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (discussing a "symbolic union" in the
context of the "effects" test), overruled on other grounds by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1985).
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populace as a whole, is deemed violative of the Clause. Justice
O'Connor does not focus upon the endorsement of one particular
religion over an), and all others, but is concerned with the sanctioning
of religion generally. If the government sends the message that the
presence of religion within our society is somehow "better" than its
absence, she holds this to be an unconstitutional endorsement of
religion.'
As applied to explicit and implicit preferences for religious land
uses, the facilitation of the construction and maintenance of places of
worship and other related uses, such as parochial schools, which
would fall within the ambit of the term "religious use," conveys an
impermissible pro-religious message.
Little needs to be said in order to substantiate this contention in
the context of the explicit preference for religious uses; by their plain
meanings, statements such as "[a] religious use is 'clearly in
furtherance of the public morals and general welfare ' r"'" convey the
message that religion is better than irreligion.
As for the implicit preference for religious uses, although the
conveyance is effectuated more subtly, the message is the same. By
excusing places of worship from requirements necessarily met by
other land uses, courts indicate that these uses are different from
others. Unless the selection of religious uses is simply arbitrary, which
is patently untenable, or a product of a broad reading of Smith, which
is jurisprudentially indefensible, they must be singled out on the basis
of some inherent characteristic(s) that render(s) them more
desirable. Put another way, courts imply that the presence of religion
(as manifested in institutions that feature the explicit goal of
furthering faith of one sort or another) is better than its absence.
Thus, under Justice O'Connor's test, which, due to the intellectual
and doctrinal middle ground occupied by its creator, may be
perceived as roughly defining the approach of the Court, such
.I S, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating, in lull, that "[a] more direct infringement [of the principles embodied in the
Establishment Clause) is government endorsement or disapproval of religion.
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, fax ored members of the political community." (emphasis added)).
Id.
Kali Bari Temple v. Bd. of Adjudication, 638 A.2d 839, 843 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994) (quoting 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF's
HE LxxW OF ZONING & PLANNING § 20.01 [3] [a], at 20-9 (4th ed. 2000)).
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favoritism for religious uses must fall.' 5"
IV. A SUGGESTION
So where does all of this leave us? The principles embodied in the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and their shared goal of
securing religious liberty'5' are of paramount importance in
contemporary society. Given the competing trends of secularization
and a renaissance of falth,1, 2 the need for a coherent doctrine of how
this common goal may be realized without transgressing the dictates
of either Clause is great.
To solve the problem of the exemption of religious land uses from
neutral zoning laws of general applicability, an absolute separation
between the realms of the ecclesiastical and the state must be
effectuated and maintained. In the zoning context, this means that
religious uses must be granted no preferential or deprecatory
treatment under the law. As I will argue, such is an absolutely vital
means to the preservation of religious liberty, an end the Framers
unquestionably sought to realize, the worth of which remains
uncontroversial. Any view on this subject will be best presented in the
context of the modem discourse on the relationship between the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, and therefore it is to this ongoing
discussion that I now turn.
The number of scholars, jurists, and other commentators who
have taken the opportunity to contribute their ideas on the proper
balance between these two provisions is overwhelming, and a
comprehensive survey of that body of work would also require a
multivolume undertaking. Here, I aim merely to provide a small,
representative sampling of some of the most interesting and prevalent
I The Court had the opportunity in City of Boerne to find exactly this, but instead
of addressing the validity of the RFRA on Establishment Clause grounds, Justice
Stevens's concurrence aside, it kept with one of the themes dominating the current
Court-a heightened emphasis on principles of federalism-and used City of Boerne to
continue a line of cases narrowly construing the remedial enforcement power afforded
Congress by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally City of Boerne, 521
U.S. at 507 (invalidating congressional action as exceeding the power possessed
pursuant to U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5); Col. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post-
Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (same); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (same).
151 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(discussing the clauses' common goal of facilitating religious liberty).
152 See generally supra text accompanying note 128 (discussing these conflicting
phenomena).
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intellectual strains and ultimately to elaborate upon my own
suggestion.
It is important to realize at the outset that a perfect reconciliation
of the Religion Clauses may well be unattainable. As one scholar has
stated, "[t]he very natures of church and state have made their
separation frustratingly difficult. Each is authoritative, each is capable
of exercising power in the public sphere with great alacrity, and each
is more than willing to use the other to accomplish its own ends.""3
Indeed, even Justice O'Connor, despite her advocacy of the
endorsement test, has acknowledged the elusiveness of a "Grand
Unified Theory. " 5' Yet while any possible balance between the clauses
may be flawed, this should not preclude efforts to minimize the
friction when the clauses do collide.
Significantly, a person's views on this particular subject are
necessarily a product of her notion of the proper role of government
vis-A-vis religion in American political and civil society.'55 For example,
Professor Monsma believes that the purpose of the Supreme Court's
Religion Clause jurisprudence is to "assure government's neutrality
toward religion. By not supporting or favoring one religious doctrine
or group over another, and by favoring neither religion nor
nonreligion, neutrality or evenhandedness is presumably
maintained.""' He claims that in practice, however, this has translated
into a system that "[i]mplicitly ... supports secularism.' ' 57 This is so,
he argues, because:
[i]f one removes all positive, supportive references to religion from all
the wide-ranging programs of the comprehensive administrative state...
morality, values, and human goals are being considered and taught,
Hamilton, supra note 96, at 808.
' d. of Educ. of KiryasJoel Vili. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712 (1994)
(O'ConnorJ, concurring).
J. This is not, however, to suggest that the matter is as simple as: those who favor
an expansive role for religion in American society desire a less pronounced separation
and vice versa. Indeed, it is precisely because religious liberty (a foundational element
of any role for religion in American social life) must be preserved that a complete
separation is essential.
1., MONSMA, supra note 6, at 40; see also Stephen G. Gilles, He), Christians, Leave
Kaut Kids Alone!, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 191 (1999) ("The Establishment Clause
adopt, a principle of neutrality among religions, and between religion and
sccularism.").
V,7 MONSN, supra note 6, at 40; see also Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the
Rli1gi,,i Claiitc , 33 I-LRV. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 505, 505 (1998) ("Neutrality has replaced
the separation of church and state as the guiding metaphor for American
seccularism.").
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either explicitly or implicitly, only in terms of the "well-being of mankind
in the present life, to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from
belief in God." Government is not being neutral between religion and
an irreligious secularism; secularism is being favored and advanced over
theistic religion.158
As a proposed solution, Monsma advocates a theory of "positive
neutrality." Under this approach, religious liberty is not perceived as
a negative freedom, i.e., one which will flourish in the absence of
governmental inhibition. It is instead something that requires
cultivation, and thus, under this normative prescription, government
must "take certain positive steps if it is to be truly neutral in the sense
of assuring equal freedoms and... opportunities for religious persons
and groups and for religious and irreligious persons and groups
alike." 59
Monsma uses the example of a military cemetery and asks whether
tombstones featuring the cross or the Star of David should be
excluded. In arguing in the negative, Monsma contends that only by
"the active, positive use of religious symbols corresponding to the...
faiths of the fallen men and women"'60 is religion "recognized and
given its due." 6" In order to be truly neutral among all religions and
between religion and irreligion, he continues, appropriate Islamic and
secular humanist symbols should also be developed so that adherents
to those beliefs may be represented as well. Only this sort of
approach, he concludes, would be truly neutral.
162
As an alternative to theories focusing on neutrality, 113 Professors
Eisgruber and Sager espouse an "equality theory." According to this
conception, "government's fundamental obligation is to treat all deep
M8 MONSMA, supra note 6, at 40-41 (citation omitted).




163 See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (discussing "'benevolent neutrality'"
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))); Carl H. Esbeck, A
Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46
EMoRY L.J. 1, 23-27 (1997) (contending that the exemption of religiously motivated
conduct, but not secular acts from neutral, generally applicable laws is justified by
neutrality theory); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 313, 331 (1996) (contending that it is "essential to the pursuit of religious
neutrality [that] the law should protect nontheists' deeply held conscientious
objection to compliance with civil law to the same extent that it protects the theistically
motivated conscientious objection of traditional believers"); McConnell & Posner,
supra note 4, at 37-38 (discussing "incentive neutrality").
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personal commitments equally, regardless of whether those
commitments are secular or religious, mainstream or unusual."'6
Underpinning this proposal is the notion that
the exemption of religiously motivated conduct from general laws
proposed by neutrality theory, standing alone, "radically favors religious
motivation, by giving it and it alone a presumptive immunity from state
regulation. It is precisely this favoritism which is normatively
indefensible, and precisely this favoritism which makes exemption seem
so much like subsidy. Redescribing it as neutrality does not solve the
problem on either score."1
65
This theory is notable for its insistence that "there is nothing
sufficiently unique about religion that justifies assigning it a
fundamentally distinct status in constitutional law."'I Moreover, Sager
and Eisgruber assert that "[t]here is no coherent normative basis for
insisting that religious commitments receive better treatment than
other, comparably serious commitments-and, as a result, it will be
impossible to identify any principled stopping point for the Free
Exercise claims [that would not inevitably run afoul of the equality
principles within the Constitution]."' ' These scholars suggest that the
Smith Court was correct in upholding neutral, generally applicable
laws against a Free Exercise challenge.
Taking issue with this contention is Professor Alan Brownstein,
who describes his own "liberty, equality and speech theory' ' 8 as a
"form of quid pro quo approach." '69 Specifically, it might be
characterized as advocating the return by the Free Exercise Clause of
some of the privileged status that the Establishment Clause removes
from religion."" This view does treat religion as being special for
purposes of ascertaining its proper constitutional status, and would
exempt religiously motivated conduct from neutral laws of general
applicability and treat religious institutions differently than secular
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 123, at 123.
Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality,
and Free Speech Values-A Critical Analysis of "Neutrality Theory" and Charitable Choice, 13
NoTRE D.AMiEJ.L. ETHIcS & PUB. POL'1 243, 248 n.15 (1999) (quoting Eisgruber &
Sager, supra note 123, at 118).
1- Id.
:,7 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 123, at 104-05.
'" Brownstein, supra note 165, at 248 n.15.
'",, Id.
17o See id. (summarizing Eisgruber and Sager's possible understanding of
Brownstein's view).
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ones. Brownstein states:
To apply [the] standard of neutrality more expansively to review all
governmental distinctions between the secular and the sacred cannot
help but jeopardize Free Exercise exemptions and institutional
autonomy as well as important Establishment Clause requirements.
A more nuanced, alternative approach recognizes that religious and
secular beliefs and practices need not always be treated in the exact same
way by government. Sometimes religious liberty concerns justify treating
religious beliefs, practices, and institutions more favorably than their
secular counterparts. Sometimes religious equality (and liberty)
concerns justify treating religious activities and organizations in a facially
less favorably way than secular ones. Moreover, under this analysis, there
is no fair and logical way to adopt only one side of the equation.
T
1
Brownstein's suggestion is something of a dynamic ledger
approach, in which the implementation of regulatory exemptions for
religion and associated activities (in other words, pro-religious
incentives) justify the provision of countervailing incentives mandated
by the Establishment Clause, thus moving the system closer, in the
broad view, to an equilibrium position.'7 3
These perspectives yield differing results when applied to religious
land uses and neutral zoning laws. The approach advocated by
Monsma, it seems, would demand that religious uses be afforded
preferential treatment, as the very existence of places of worship is
necessary if religion is to be afforded the opportunity to gain a
foothold in American society equal to that enjoyed by secular
employments.
Given that the absence of a common law preference for religious
land uses (and the resultant applicability of neutral zoning laws) could
serve to exclude synagogues, temples, mosques, and the like, a
doctrine that renders religious uses subject to neutral regulations"T
would be viewed as supporting secularism instead of genuine
neutrality, and would therefore be undesirable. Monsma would likely
disagree with my argument concerning the lack of tension between
the Free Exercise Clause and the applicability of neutral regulations to
religious uses, if not as a matter of actual jurisprudence then in terms
171 See id.
172 Id. at 276.
173 See id. at 249 (advocating a more holistic approach in using "constitutional
standards to further the goal of incentive neutrality").
174 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80
(1990) (maintaining that the Free Exercise Clause permits application of neutral,
generally applicable laws to religiously motivated actions).
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of normative doctrine. He would certainly take issue with the idea
that the Establishment Clause precludes such institutionalized
favoritism as is embodied in exemptions for places of worship.
The equality-based notion advocated by Eisgruber and Sager
would completely diverge from Monsma's view. Given that they fail to
perceive an) legitimate basis for distinguishing between ecclesiastical
and secular entities insofar as neutral, generally applicable laws are
concerned, they would likely agree with the contentions made thus far
in this Comment.
Finally, Professor Brounstein would agree with Monsma, and for
similar reasons. Instead of viewing favoritism for religious uses as
necessary to avoid a pro-secular doctrinal regime, he would likely view
such preferential treatment for the very physical structures in which
religious practice usually transpires as a necessary means of ensuring
the continued liberty to worship as contemplated by the Free Exercise
Clause. 7-'
My own notion of the proper balance between the clauses lies
closest to that espoused by Eisgruber and Sager, although there is a
significant divergence between their preferred view and my own. On
a more rudimentary level, I disagree in principle with the theoretical
underpinnings of the views advocated by Monsma and Brownstein. I
do not believe that, as Monsma contends, the neutrality doctrine is
actually a thinly veiled, tacit espousal of secularism. In fact, the view
that religion must be affirmatively promoted in order to achieve
genuine neutrality between religion and irreligion mistakes a system
that advocates neither of these positions for one that affirmatively
endorses the absence of faith-centered belief. Simply stated, to refuse
to endorse religion is not to advocate nonecclesiasticism any more
than a refusal to endorse a system of affirmative action is to espouse
racism. Certainly some who oppose affirmative action do so as a
means of facilitating the realization of a racist end, but equally
certainly, some individuals who are deeply committed to racial
equality are not proponents of affirmative action. 76  Similarly, it is
17 Brownstein has explicitly aired his disagreement with the result in Smith. See
Brojwnstein, supra note 165, at 276 (arguing that the expansive application of neutral
review of "governmental distinctions between the secular and the sacred cannot help
but jeopardize Free Exercise exemptions").
As three of many potential examples, one might consider the views of Justice
Clarence Thomas and those of Professors Stephen Carter and Shelby Steele. STEPHEN
L, CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 232-35 (1991); SHELBY
SIFELE, A DREXM DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM IN AMERICA
19-23 (1998); Note, Lasting Stigma: Affirmative Action and Clarence Thomas's Prisoners'
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possible to be highly committed to the tenets of a particular faith and
still believe that the government should take no part in advocating
that view. When governmental authorities actively refuse to endorse
religion, they are not endorsing secularism-instead they are merely
relegating such issues of faith to their appropriate sphere: the
individual conscience.
Moreover, I do not believe, as Brownstein does, in the desirability
of a First Amendment jurisprudence that balances the dictates of the
Religion Clauses on a case-by-case basis, with favoritism sometimes,
but not always, beingjustified. Not only is this inconsistent with Smith
and with the historical meaning of the Religion Clauses, but such an
approach would also place a particularly sensitive area of
constitutional doctrine in an inherently standardless, exploitable
adjudicatory mode, subject to manipulation at the whim of a swing
Justice's fancy. It would also result in the absence of effective
signposts to governmental entities indicating which types of actions
vis-:k-vis religious land uses, and indeed religion in general, would
constitute acceptable accommodation and which would cross the line
drawn by the Establishment Clause.
Most fundamentally, I disagree with these scholars in their
contention that the state may in any way, explicitly or implicitly,
endorse or promote religion without running afoul of the
Establishment Clause. For religious land uses to be afforded
preferential treatment by the state, no matter how subtle that
favoritism might be, inherently conveys the message that the
government officially endorses religion generally. This is
unacceptable not only because it is facially inconsistent with the ideas
held by Madison and Jefferson and manifested in that Clause, but
further because the ability of the state to take a pro-religious stance
threatens to undermine the religious liberty sought by many who
advocate such a broad construction of governmental power. Indeed,
the complete separation of the religious and political realms is crucial
because it prevents government from intermingling in any way with
religion. If this prohibition is removed in the manner suggested by
Monsma and Brownstein, the security enjoyed by the American
citizenry to worship, and indeed to believe as they wish, would become
instantlyjeopardized. If government is free to aid religion, there is no
principled basis for holding that it is not free to denigrate it as well.
This result would be directly contrary to the end that Monsma and
RightsJurisprudence, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1333-36 (1999).
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Brownstein advocate and for which the Framers so diligently strove.
Eisgruber and Sager, on the other hand, come closer to
articulating a viable means of balancing the Clauses. By contending
that neutral regulation of religion is constitutionally unproblematic,
the), demonstrate a historically and pragmatically more defensible
reading of the Establishment Clause, and avoid the hyper-expansive
reading of the Free Exercise Clause that marks the analyses of
Monsma and Brownstein. Their insistence upon equal governmental
treatment of all sorts of personal commitments is well placed.
However, they are incorrect in asserting that:
The Constitution singles out religious liberty for special attention, but
that attention centers on the ideal of equal regard, pursuant to which
the deep concerns of religious believers are protected against hostility,
indifference, or a failure of comprehension, and assured equal stature
with the deep concerns of other citizens. The Constitution emphatically
does not privilege religious concerns.177
Quite the contrary, not only is religion singled out by the
Constitution for special attention, but that emphasis does take the
form of privilege. By insisting upon absolute neutrality among
religions and between religion and irreligion, the Constitution
emphatically does privilege religion in a broad sense: it is uniquely
afforded a guarantee of survival while other modes of activity are not
so protected. Unlike camping, jetskiing, or minor league baseball,""
religion may not be dismantled or singularly targeted for unfavorable
treatment by the state. It is important to realize that inherent in the
"singling out" of religious activity, in the manner effectuated by the
Constitution, is the bestowal of a specially protected status upon it.
Thus, religious land uses must be subject to neutral laws of
general applicability. In more general terms, few argue that religion
may be uniquely denigrated, as such actions would clearly constitute a
Free Exercise violation of the primary order. Crucially, however,
equally fatal shortcomings exist in arguments to the effect that
religion and its attendant activities and facilities should be elevated
over any other sort of land use or activity. To thus breach the wall
between church and state would subject religious liberty to the will of
a popularly accountable legislature, and thus to faction and the
transient passions of the electorate. Madison valued the freedom of
177 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 123, at 106.
S7 Se FunNJ.com, Fun & Adventure in NJ, at http://w.funnj.com (last visited
Apr. 2, 2001 ) (describing these and other fun yet affordable NewJersey activities).
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conscience far too much to leave it so vulnerable.
It is the legacy of the Framers' convictions that we Americans have
inherited, and it is their fundamental goals that we must strive to
implement. We must therefore effectuate a complete separation,
keeping foremost in mind the ideas that religion is special, and that
we are zealously guarding religious liberty. The Constitution was
drafted by individuals who so prized their faith that they took great
care to secure it from governmental usurpation. To understand its
Religion Clauses is to appreciate that exemptions for religious uses
from neutral, generally applicable zoning laws destroy that security.
